A court may thus exercise “protective jurisdiction” if the criminal defendant’s conduct has a “materially harmful impact” upon governmental processes or the welfare of the community. It is not sufficient under the statute that the conduct caused an injury to a particular person; what is required is injury to the county’s governmental processes or community as a whole, and that the defendant intended that effect or acted with knowledge of such effect.
This court is not aware of any cases applying CPL 20.40 (2) (c) to confer jurisdiction over a prosecution charging a criminal defendant with failure to register under SORA. A starting point in understanding this statute as it applies to the present case is the Court of Appeals analysis, and the examples it provided in its opinion.
Some cases have found protective jurisdiction where conduct in one county would further the commission of a potential crime in the county in which a prosecution for such conduct (but not the future crime) was brought. Other cases have found protective jurisdiction where a defendant’s out-of-county conduct would have an effect particularly on governmental processes. CPL 20.40 (2), however, is not limited to these situations, for it extends to any conduct that has a material effect on the community, if such conduct was performed with the requisite intent under the statute.