New York Criminal Lawyer Blog

The Facts:

Defendant, his brother, and another man entered the house of a woman and robbed her at gunpoint. A New York Criminal Lawyer said the woman identified defendant as the one who wielded the gun during the robbery. A police officer was on patrol when he saw three men run out of the woman’s house, followed by her screaming for help. The officer gave chase and managed to arrest the brother, who was found to have a loaded revolver in his front pocket. The brother provided defendant's name and stated that the defendant had placed the gun in his pocket while they fled the woman’s residence.

Thereafter, defendant was arrested at his home. Upon arrest, defendant stated that the arresting officers got nothing on him and that they got the gun of his brother.
The seized revolver was tested and found operable.

Defendant presented evidence to show that it was not him but a third man who displayed the gun during the robbery and then placed it in his brother's pocket.

Defendant was charged as principal and accomplice on six counts: 3 counts of robbery in the first degree – forcibly steals property armed with a deadly weapon, used or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, and displayed what appeared to be a handgun, respectively; 1 count of robbery in the second degree – forcibly steals property aided by another person actually present; grand larceny in the third degree – steals property taken from the person of another; and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree – possession of a loaded firearm, a handgun crime or felony.

Defendant was convicted on 1 count of robbery in the first degree, 1 count of robbery in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. He was acquitted on the 2 counts of robbery in the second degree.

Defendant moved to set aside the guilty verdicts as repugnant to the acquittals on the 2 counts of robbery in the second degree.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the jury had been instructed not to reach a verdict on the grand larceny charge if they convicted on any of the first four counts of robbery and criminal possession, thus, no claim of repugnancy was made on the basis of that differing result.

The Supreme Court ruled that there was no repugnancy between the verdicts on the robberies but that a guilty verdict on count criminal possession was repugnant to acquittal on the 2 counts of robbery in the first degree. The trial court reasoned that each of the robbery counts involved different elements so that one could be found guilty or not guilty on the various charges without any inconsistency. However, that court continued, it is illogical to acquit on the 2 counts of robbery in the first degree, but finds that the defendant possessed a loaded handgun at the time.

Consequently, the jury's verdict was sustained except as to criminal possession, which was set aside.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the decision, without opinion.

On appeal, defendant argues that the jury's acquittal on the two counts of robbery in the first degree, when considered with the conviction on the charge of criminal possession, must have been based on a determination that no "forcible stealing" occurred; that the verdicts on 1 count of robbery in the first degree and 1 count of robbery in the second degree would have to be rejected as an essential element of each crime would have been negated.

The Ruling:

The court finds that the defendant's argument is not persuasive.
The problem of repugnant, or inconsistent, verdicts has long plagued the common law. Many jurisdictions precluded any judgment of conviction if the verdicts were inconsistent. A New York Sex Crimes Lawyer commented that American courts have divided on the question, with the majority accepting that the conviction is valid, albeit inconsistent.

Whether verdicts are described as "repugnant" or "inconsistent" is substantively inconsequential and so the two terms are used interchangeably here. The critical concern is that an individual should not be convicted for a crime on which the jury has actually found that the defendant did not commit an essential element, whether it is one element or all. Allowing such a verdict to stand is not merely inconsistent with justice, but is repugnant to it.

The genesis of repugnancy problems lies in the submission to the jury of alternative theories of guilt, in the form of different counts, based upon the same evidence. The problem often occurs when the jury convicts the defendant on one count and acquits on another, but the verdicts are illogical when viewed in light of the proof adduced. A New York Drug Possession Lawyer said that he difficulty stems from the jury's implicit finding that the essential elements of one crime were proven, while one or more of the same elements were not proven for the other crime.

Under the rules, there are two approaches for determining whether jury verdicts are repugnant. First, the court would review the record in toto so as to consider all the evidence and discover the underlying basis of the jury's determination, whereupon the reviewing court can determine the logic or illogic of the verdicts and remedy the repugnancy when it exists. Second, looking to the record only to review the jury charge so as to ascertain what essential elements were described by the trial court; then, the alleged inconsistent verdicts will be harmonized on the basis of the jury charge. Under this approach, a conviction will be reversed only in those instances where acquittal on one crime as charged to the jury is conclusive as to a necessary element of the other crime, as charged, for which the guilty verdict was rendered.
There is a compelling policy reason for preferring the second method of analysis. The first approach, by its very nature, requires the court to intrude into the jury's deliberative process by speculating on how the jury perceived and weighed the evidence. The court's reluctance to do so is generally reflected by limiting attacks on jury verdicts to showing improper influence, while excluding for purpose of impeachment "proof of the tenor of deliberations". The problems of second-guessing are compounded by the possibility that the jury has not necessarily acted irrationally, but has exercised mercy. When the jury has decided to show lenity to the defendant, an accepted power of the jury, the court should not then undermine the jury's role and participation by setting aside the verdict.

Hence, the record should be reviewed only as to the jury charge. Even that review of the jury charge will be restricted in its scope. It does not contemplate a consideration of the accuracy of the charge. The instructions to the jury will be examined only to determine whether the jury, as instructed, must have reached an inherently self-contradictory verdict.

Here, defendant's convictions for robbery can be affirmed only if there was a basis for distinguishing among the various "weaponry" elements of the 3 counts of robbery and criminal possession. The instructions to the jury closely matched the basic definitions provided by law. The only material discrepancy was that the court did not explain that a conviction on the sixth count would be inappropriate unless the jury found that the gun was operable. Once deliberations begin, the jury may freely reject evidence and exercise its mercy function. It could find, however illogically, that the gun's capability to fire was not proven. Not having been instructed that the capability to fire is also an essential element of the possession charge, there would be no inherent inconsistency in the acquittals on the 2 counts of robbery in the first degree, both of which require a finding of operability, and the conviction on criminal possession.

As each count is treated separately with the varying burdens and degrees of proof being taken into consideration, there is no incompatibility between the verdicts on the issue of operability. In considering the 2 counts of robbery in the first degree, the jury could conclude that the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was capable of firing, and therefore acquit. The jury could also conclude without self-contradiction that the People had carried its burden in proving that defendant displayed what appeared to be a handgun, necessary to 1 count of robbery in the second degree, but that defendant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was inoperable.

In terms of the essential elements of the underlying charges, the verdicts on 1 count of robbery in the first degree and criminal possession are inconsistent when viewed in light of the convictions on another count of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second e. Implicit in the robbery convictions was a finding that defendant forcibly stole property. The acquittal on the first count of robbery in the first degree, then, would require that the jury concluded that the prosecutor failed to prove that the gun was either loaded or operable. Thus, a conviction on criminal possession would be legally inconsistent as the jury would have found that the gun was loaded and operable. However, as noted, the jury was not adequately apprised of the legal elements necessary to support a conviction on criminal possession. Henceforth, no actual inconsistency has been presented.

Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the robbery counts.

In addition, defendant argues error to the jury instructions. However, defendant admittedly failed to object to the instruction at trial. Consequently, that issue has not been preserved and the court cannot rule on it.

In all, the order of the Appellate Division is affirmed. When there is a claim that repugnant jury verdicts have been rendered in response to a multiple-count indictment, a verdict as to a particular count shall be set aside only when it is inherently inconsistent when viewed in light of the elements of each crime as charged to the jury. Review of the entire record in an attempt to divine the jury's collective mental process of weighing the evidence is inappropriate.

For assistance with issues similar to the above, contact a New York City Criminal Lawyer at Stephen Bilkis & Associates. We provide free consultations with our legal experts. A New York City Possession of a Weapon Lawyer from our firm is willing and ready to assist you with your legal problems.

The plaintiff and appellee in this case is the United States of America. The defendant and appellant of the case is Roy L. Schmidt, III. The case is being heard in the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals.

Appeal

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the defendant, Roy L. Schmidt, III, is appealing the conviction that he is an Armed Career Criminal as defined by the Armed Career Criminal Act. Roy L. Schmidt, III in the original case pleaded guilty to the conspiracy of possessing a pipe bomb and of being a convicted felon with possession of the pipe bomb. He is challenging the sentencing from the district court. His reasoning is that the determination of his sentencing used a prior conviction of theft of a firearm was listed as a violent felony for the purpose of convicting him under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Case Facts and History

Before the end of the year 2007, Schmidt made an agreement with another individual to buy the parts for and build a pipe bomb. A New York Criminal Lawyer said it was also agreed for Schmidt to receive this unregistered pipe bomb. He provided the necessary money to the individual for the bomb components to be purchased at Lowes and Home Depot, located in Jefferson, Louisiana. Schmidt and two other individuals constructed three pipe bombs at the one of the individual’s homes. Schmidt then took possession of one of the pipe bombs.

Schmidt was charged with the conspiracy to possess a pipe bomb that was unregistered in October of 2008. He pleaded guilty and did not enter a plea agreement. His sentence hearing was held in November of 2009. The United States Government produced documents to support his convictions of an attempted robbery that occurred in December of 1993, a simple burglary that happened in July o f1993, a possession of stolen items charge from August of 1996, and a simple burglary that occurred in August of 1996 as well.

Schmidt’s presentence report concluded that his previous violations and convictions were crimes of violence. The base level of 24 was given in his preliminary criminal history report. Additional enhancements were assigned for the use of a pipe bomb, use of a firearm, leadership role in offenses, and the involvement of a minor in the offenses. He received an adjustment downward for accepting responsibility for his offenses. The presentencing report determined that Schmidt was qualified as an Armed Career Criminal based on the convictions as listed above. The report set his sentencing at a range between 188 to 235 months imprisonment for the firearms charge and up to 60 months imprisonment for the charges of conspiracy.

Appeal Case

Schmidt argues that he should not be listed as an Armed Career Criminal because the theft that was from a firearms dealer was not a violent crime and he did not involved any minors in his offences. A New York Sex Crimes Lawyer said the district court ruled in favor of the non involvement of the minor and lowered the sentence to 151 to 188 months imprisonment. However, the district court denied the argument that stealing from a firearms dealer is not a violent crime.

Conclusion

A New York Drug Possession Lawyer said etermining whether or not a crime of violence qualifies for the Armed Career Criminal Act is determined by the outline of the act. In this case, we have determined under the act that the theft of a firearm from an arms dealer does qualify as a violent offense. For this reason we affirm the original decision and the sentence stands.

Anyone that has been in trouble with the law or currently finds themselves in need of legal advice should contact Stephen Bilkis & Associates for help. Our offices located in New York offer free consultations to anyone in need of advice. Call us today to set up your appointment.

Around 1985, a detective in plain-clothes and an unmarked car was working a known drug area in Queens when he and his partner saw a transaction that they believed was drug related. A New York Drug Crime Lawyer said they saw one man approach another and hand him money. The other man produced a three by five inch brown envelope and the first man took it in exchange for the money. The officers believed that it was a drug transaction based on the fact that the bags were the size, shape, and description of units called, “three dollar bags” that are often used for drug crimes.

The two officers got out of their car and approached the two men. They identified themselves as police and the two men took flight. A short foot chase ensued in which the defendant threw his hat off and then threw something black into some bushes. A New York Drug Possession Lawyer said one officer retrieved the two items, at which time he discovered that the black item was a handgun. The defendant stopped running and was taken into custody and placed under arrest. Upon checking the operability of the weapon, it was discovered that it was a fully loaded nine-millimeter pistol that was also functional.

The defendant was convicted of drug crime and criminal possession of a weapon. He promptly filed an appeal. His claim is that the officer’s initial stop was investigatory. As such, the officers would have to show reasonable suspicion that a crime is, had, or was about to be committed and that the defendant was one of them. A Nassau County Drug Possession Lawyer said that he contends that the mere passing of an envelope from one person to another on a public street was no implication of a criminal enterprise. He also stated that when he ran, they had no right to chase him because he was only exercising his constitutional right to leave without answering questions.

The justices contend that the officers were well within their rights because they observed conduct that they were able to articulate to the court, based on their experience, and training as police officers, led them to believe that a crime had been committed and that the defendant was involved in a substantial manner. The justices felt that any ordinary police officer, given the same facts and circumstances would come to the same conclusion. Therefore, the stop was justified.

The defendant claimed that the level of police intrusion was too severe for the circumstances. A Queens Drug Possession Lawyer said that he should have the right to hand some money to an acquaintance on the side of the road without being intruded upon by police officers. The justices disagreed again. At the point where a person recognizes a police officer as a law enforcement officer, and then takes flight upon seeing him, he has behaved in a manner that is not within the norm of society. The level of police intrusion was appropriate given the circumstances. One of the deciding factors in the voracity of the encounter was that the incident occurred in a known drug area. The encounter would have been more difficult to justify to the court if the incident had occurred in a business area in the middle of the day. At that point, the exchange of a manila envelope for cash would not logically have ben assumable as a drug transaction. It could be business papers. The location of the incident and the time of day create a different picture of what was transpiring between the two men. There is no doubt that when the officers first exited the car, they had an intention to find out more information. When the defendant took flight upon their approach gives objective reason to support the intrusion of privacy that was necessary by the police officers.

At Stephen Bilkis & Associates Queens Criminal Lawyers are available to help you in convenient offices throughout New York and the Metropolitan area. Your freedom is our concern. Our Queens Drug Lawyers are trained to provide you with the best defense possible.

On 22 November 2006, defendant stood accused, by felony complaint filed, of criminal possession of marijuana in the first degree, a class C felony (drug crime); on account of an incident that occurred on 21 November 2006. At his 22 November 2006 arraignment, the court conditionally released defendant, to the supervision of the Department of Probation, and adjourned the case to Part 9, which thereafter transferred the case to County Court. On 25 January 2007, the case was returned to Part 9 of the herein court, and adjourned to 20 March 2007. On 20 March 2007, the court revoked defendant's conditional release status, evidently because of his failure to participate in therapy as directed by the Department of Probation, and because of his arrest on 18 February 2007 for assault in the third degree. The court fixed bail at $25,000 bond, $15,000 cash and adjourned the case for three days, to 23 March 2007, for disposition. Defendant did not post bail.

A New York Drug Crime Lawyer said according to the transcript of a joint plea proceeding conducted on 23 March 2007, another individual was arrested with defendant, also for felony possession of marijuana on account of the incident on 21 November 2006, and both defendant and the other individual were represented from the outset by a lawyer. During the course of the single plea proceeding conducted on 23 March 2007, the court converted the felony complaint pending against defendant, and the felony complaint pending against the other individual, to accuse each of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. No supporting deposition demonstrating that scientific tests were performed on the substance forming the basis of the prosecution is annexed to the converted document, designated as a misdemeanor complaint, has been filed against defendant. Moreover, by the factual part of the document, the complainant attests only that defendant "possessed" more than 10 pounds of a "greenish brown leafy substance believed to be marijuana," and that "the arresting detective who recovered the evidence believes the substance to be marijuana based on his years of training as a police officer and detective, its appearance, color, odor and texture and its packaging which is commonly used by drug dealers. But while the other individual pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of disorderly conduct, defendant pleaded guilty to violating the Penal Law of possessing more than two ounces of marijuana, the crime of which he then stood accused. The court sentenced each to a conditional discharge and the maximum fine permissible for the offense to which each pleaded guilty.

Neither defendant nor the other individual waived the right to be prosecuted by information when arraigned on the converted accusatory instruments immediately before entering their pleas of guilty. A New York Drug Possession Lawyer said during the course of the joint plea allocution, the court asked defendant and the other individual if they consented to one attorney representing both of them. Each answered "yes." The court then asked if there is no conflict of interest in any way. Each responded "no." When both were asked if they had discussed the case with their attorney before pleading guilty, each answered "yes". Following questioning about educational background and mental status, defendant stated he has a fifth grade education; the other completed high school. The court asked defendant if he understood that he was pleading guilty to a crime, that he would have a criminal record, and that the crime is punishable by up to a year in jail, a fine, or a combination of both, and the defendant responded "yes." Defendant also answered "yes" when the court asked if he understood that, by pleading guilty, he was also waiving his right to a trial and his right to appeal. Oddly, when the court asked "do you wish to plead guilty to a crime," defendant and the other individual each answered "yes." Ultimately, defendant admitted that on 21 November 2006, he possessed marijuana, the weight of which was not specified. A Nassau County Drug Possession Lawyer said the other individual admitted that he behaved in a disorderly manner on that date. As noted, the court sentenced each to a conditional discharge and a fine. Other than noting his appearance, joining in the People's application to reduce the charge, waiving a reading of the new charge, and, at the conclusion of the proceeding, addressing defendant's bail status, defendant’s counsel (for the plea) stated nothing on the record. Included in the court file is a certificate of relief from civil disabilities, based on an application defendant made on 6 November 2008, by which he specifically sought a certificate that will relieve him from any bars that would prevent him from traveling.

On 18 August 2010, defendant made an application to vacate the judgment of conviction and underlying plea entered on 23 March 2007. Asserting that his lawyer at that time affirmatively misrepresented the effect that his guilty plea would have on his immigration status, that his lawyer was burdened with a conflict of interest, and that his lawyer did not properly advise him about that conflict; defendant based his application on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant brought to the court’s attention a decision dated 24 May 2011 issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals upholding a ruling that an alien who violates an order of protection "is deportable."

The court has reviewed and takes judicial notice of the court file concerning defendant's arrest in 2007 that was one of the triggers of the revocation of his bail status in the herein case.
A Queens Drug Possession Lawyer said the review reveals that on 18 February 2007, defendant was accused of assault in the third degree, that he was released on bail during the pendency of the action, that on 13 November 2007 he pleaded guilty to harassment as a violation, that he was on that date sentenced to a conditional discharge and a $200 fine which he paid, that the court vacated a temporary order of protection issued in favor of another person, and that the court did not issue a permanent order of protection. The court has reviewed, not only the plea minutes defendant submits, but also the court file in a matter concerning his 2009 arrest, for criminal contempt in the second degree where defendant retained the same lawyer to represent him again, to which the People point as a claimed demonstration that the lawyer’s representation was effective.

A review of the court file reveals that the court issued a temporary order of protection in favor of another person in yet another matter, apparently now sealed, that defendant was accused of violating that order of protection, that he was released on bail during the pendency of the prosecution, that on 23 November 2010 he pleaded guilty to attempted criminal contempt in the second degree, a class B misdemeanor, and that he admitted that notwithstanding the existence of a "stay away" order of protection he was in close proximity to the named person in the order on 10 September 2009. The court made a commitment that he would not be sentenced to jail, and on 24 January 2011, the court sentenced defendant to one year of probation.

It must be noted that, in order to prevail on an application to vacate a judgment of conviction on account of the ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his or her attorney's professional services were deficient, that they fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that he or she is thereby prejudiced; that absent the deficiency, the result would have been different. Where the services rendered involve negotiating a plea, the defendant must satisfy the prejudice component by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recently made it clear that not only does affirmatively misinforming a client about the immigration consequences of conviction premised on a guilty plea constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, so, too — assuming, obviously, that the defendant is not a citizen — does failing to render any advice whatsoever on that topic. The Appellate Term recently ruled that the holding in the aforesaid case should be applied retroactively, thus making that ruling applicable in the case at bar.

Every defendant is entitled to zealous, conflict-free representation by someone single-mindedly devoted to his or her best interests, and taking on representation that will burden the attorney with conflicting loyalties also constitutes ineffective assistance. Where a defendant demonstrates the existence of an actual conflict of interest, prejudice can be presumed.
Here, the court finds the defendant’s and the other individual’s testimonies essentially credible. Moreover, even if their lawyer did not affirmatively misinform defendant of the immigration consequences of his plea, it is clear that, at best, he was silent on the subject.

Against the backdrop of the lawyer’s candid admission that, in March, 2007, he was unaware that Congress had in 1996 significantly changed the law regarding the mandatory immigration consequences resulting from certain convictions beyond those involving "moral turpitude" — most notably convictions stemming from possession-of-more-than-30-grams-of-marijuana and possession-of-a-controlled-substance charges — coupled with his similarly candid admission that, even though he thought defendant was Jamaican, he did not ask defendant about his immigration status, and that status did not enter into his considerations when he was negotiating with the People, or, tacitly, when advising defendant to accept their offer. The court must find that he did convey to both defendant and the other individual (whom he essentially dealt with jointly and who each acknowledged during the perfunctory plea allocution that they were pleading guilty to a crime) that the only real consequence of each of the pleas was payment of a fine; that both pleas were "no biggy."

The court is even more disturbed by what the lawyer acknowledges is the "inherent" conflict of interest under which he labored, a conflict that became more acute when the People presented him with "no split" offers compelling one of two defendants to plead guilty to a misdemeanor so that the other could plead guilty to a violation. And the court’s concerns are not assuaged by the lawyer’s without-inquiry acceptance of the People's rationale for the differing offers, most notably the claim that defendant exhibited consciousness of guilt by running from someone in "regular clothes" who was pointing a gun at him in his crime-ridden neighborhood and who did not announce herself as a police officer.

In the instant case, it is clear that defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel; a fact that does not retroactively disappear merely because defendant later retained the same lawyer, whom he had trusted, to represent him in another matter. Indeed, the real issue to be determined is whether defendant was prejudiced by the ineffectiveness of his representation. The court concludes that he was.

As the United States Supreme Court has itself recognized, being able to remain in the United States is often more important to a defendant than any potential jail sentence. In this case, although defendant was incarcerated on the day he entered his plea of guilty, the judge, upon revoking defendant's conditional-release status, adjourned the case for "disposition" for only three days; that he did so to briefly punish defendant for violating the conditions of his at-arraignment release. Since any attorney single-mindedly devoted to defendant's bests interests would have made an appropriate application for adjustment of defendant's bail status if he elected to proceed to trial, and since defendant made bail on his other pending cases, there is no support for the People's speculation that defendant would have remained in jail awaiting trial if he rejected their plea offer. Furthermore, the chance that Defendant would be sentenced to any significant jail time if convicted of the original charge of criminal possession of marijuana in the first degree is remote, and the probability that he would be sentenced to probation without jail is high, whereas, it appears, the immigration consequence — automatic removal — is the same whether defendant were convicted of the original felony charge laid against him, or of the misdemeanor possession-of-marijuana charge to which he pleaded guilty. These circumstances alone demonstrate that it is at least reasonably likely that, had the lawyer properly advised him about the immigration consequence of his misdemeanor plea, defendant would have rejected the offer and insisted on going to trial. Indeed, given the paucity of real, direct evidence of defendant's guilt, not only would rejection of the plea offer have been rational, it would have been prudent.

On the question of whether defendant's other legal difficulties also have adverse immigration consequences so as to render his claims of prejudice, in this regard, moot, defendant has come forward with a recently decided Board of Immigration Appeals case which suggests that his conviction for attempted criminal contempt in the second degree may subject him to removal. But apart from the fact that the conviction challenged here subjects defendant to the more dire consequence of automatic removal, defendant raised another issue which, standing alone, warrants vacatur of the plea and judgment, i.e., the inherent, and ultimately impossible conflict of interest burdening the lawyer, who also represented the other individual charged in the marijuana possession.

The record demonstrates that, while the lawyer actually conferred at least once with the other individual, alone, outside of court, the lawyer never met with defendant alone, and that he always had his discussions with him in the presence of the other individual charged, in court, where conversations are often hurried and somewhat public. Indeed, there is no indication that the lawyer even consulted with defendant in "the pens." The record also demonstrates that it was only through the other individual that the lawyer received payment for his services to defendant. The record thus at least suggests that the lawyer regarded the other individual charged as his primary client, even as it demonstrates that he regarded the disparate legal positions of his two clients as essentially the same, and that he conveyed that sameness to both of them. Because the People here insisted that their offer to the other individual of a plea to a non-criminal offense was conditioned on defendant's acceptance of a plea that gave him a criminal record, a consequence that has lasting adverse effects, even for those who are not subject to deportation, the lawyer could not possibly single mindedly represent either of them without compromising his obligations to the other.

Hence, the court finds that there was an actual conflict of interest, and that the conflict infected defendant's plea of guilty. Moreover, the People's assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the perfunctory inquiry conducted on an apparently defective accusatory instrument during the equally perfunctory plea allocution does not demonstrate either that defendant understood the nature of the conflict, or that he knowingly waived it.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction with its underlying plea of guilty is ordered vacated; the felony complaint is restored, the matter is referred back to Criminal Term Part 9P, and defendant is directed to appear with counsel in that part.

The freedom to choose counsel for legal representation is vital to the success of one’s case. The question of whether an accused may or may not be convicted lies greatly on the counsel’s efficiency. Thus, it is best to choose wisely. We, at Stephen Bilkis & Associates have the best lawyers available. Our legal teams are highly competitive with extensive experiences in criminal law. Contact us for a free consultation and speak with our Queens Criminal Attorneys or Queens Drug Attorneys.

A pharmacist was waiting in the parking lot of a gas station in Plainview when detectives overheard him having a conversation on his cell phone. The conversation was about a drug sale he was about to make. The detectives watched as 53 year old Syosset resident Robert Ciskanik sold narcotics out of his car. They then arrested Ciskanik and Hosam Karin, a 57 year old Freeport resident. Ciskanik was found to have over 400 oxycodone pills on his person. Karin had 15 Cialis pills on his person. While police were arresting the two men, another car pulled into the Old Country Road gas station. The passenger of the car walked over to Ciskanik’s car looking for him. The man, Michael Lulo of Nesconset, was found to have more than $17,000.00 cash on him as well as oxycodone and methadone. He was also put under arrest. Reports state that Ciskanik was licensed in New York State as a pharmacist but do not release where he was employed. According to a NY Criminal Lawyer, Ciskanik was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance, criminal possession of a narcotic and criminal sale of a controlled substance. He was held on $100,000.00 bail. Lulo was charged with criminal possession of a narcotic and conspiracy. He was released on $6,000.00 bail. Karin was given a desk appearance ticket (DAT). All three men will be arraigned at Nassau County First District Court; located at 99 Main Street, Hempstead NY 11550. Drug Possession is treated very seriously in New York City and Westchester County.

Continue reading "Three men are arrested on various drug possession charges in Long Island, NY. It seems they will need a Nassau County Criminal Lawyer." »

According to a New York Criminal Lawyer, a Chief Deputy District Attorney was arrested and accused of possession of rock cocaine in Las Vegas. Drug Possession in New York City or Long Island are serious crimes with huge penalties for the offender.

The 10-year veteran was working on a task force and handled celebrity drug scandals including busts of Paris Hilton and Bruno Mars. He could not be reached for comment regarding this matter. This would also be a very serious matter in Brooklyn, NY.

A District Attorney in the area revealed that in going over the defendant’s cases, he was relieved that there had been no wrongful prosecutions, explaining that everything checked out in the system and there should be no concern that the Deputy Chief had access to the drugs that were supposed to be evidence.
A Las Vegas Officer stopped the District Attorney’s white BMW a little before 5pm on Saturday near Desert Inn Road, an area where drugs are rampant. As officers got near the car, a passenger, 43, jumped out of the passenger side and ran. He later told officers that he knew the defendant only as "Joe," a regular customer who would call his cell phone to set up small drug buys. The passenger has had trouble with the law in the past, but there is no indication he was in a case involved with the defendant.

The Chief Deputy was supposedly a regular customer buying the drugs two to three times a week for at least the past six months. It is unclear at this time whether his actions hindered any investigations. Although his 10-year marriage ended in divorce in 2005, the defendant has had no trouble with the law other than this recent arrest. As a prosecutor, handled several high profile cases; in addition to the Paris Hilton and Bruno Mars cases, he also handled the case of Steven Zegrean, a casino shooter that was convicted in 2009 for an attack two years earlier that left four people wounded.

No statement was made from the defendant and he is scheduled to appear in Las Vegas Justice Court in May.

Continue reading "Chief Deputy District Attorney Arrested on Drug Charges" »