Articles Posted in Criminal Procedure

Published on:

by

A criminal defendant has the right to a verdict reached by jurors who can decide the case without bias. When a court receives information that a juror may have acted with racial bias during deliberations, the court must respond with care. The judge must protect the defendant’s right to an impartial jury while also avoiding needless intrusion into the jury room. In People v. Wiggins, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court should have declared a mistrial after one juror reported that other jurors had made comments reflecting racial bias during deliberations. The case required the Court to examine the trial judge’s inquiry, the responses given by the jurors who were questioned, and whether the denial of a mistrial fell within the court’s discretion.

Background Facts

The charges arose from two shootings in Buffalo during the early morning of August 4, 2016. The first shooting happened near Maple Street around 1:00 a.m. and left one person wounded. About one hour later, a second shooting happened near Sherman Street and left one person dead and two others injured. The defendant was charged in one indictment with crimes arising from both incidents.

by
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

In People v. Moss, the New York Court of Appeals considered how a prior sex crime conviction affected classification under the Sex Offender Registration Act, often called SORA. The case focused on one of the Guidelines overrides that can automatically raise a person’s presumptive risk level. The issue was whether that override applied when the defendant claimed that an earlier felony sex crime conviction was unconstitutional, even though that conviction had never been vacated or reversed. The Court examined the text of the Guidelines, the available procedures for challenging a conviction, and the limited effect of a prior resentencing ruling in one of defendant’s criminal cases.

Background Facts

The defendant had a long record of sex offense convictions. In 1995, he pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct for raping a 13-year-old child when he was 25 years old. In 2006, he pleaded guilty to course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree for repeated sexual abuse of a child from 2004 through January 2006, when the child was between 10 and 12 years old. During that time, the victim became pregnant, and the defendant arranged for an abortion. In 2007, he pleaded guilty to forcible touching for touching a 15-year-old girl while masturbating. In 2016, he was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child after incidents involving a seven-year-old relative whom he was babysitting.

Published on:

by

(People v W, NY Slip Op 07926)

The court states that pursuant to PL170.10 a sporting event ticket carries with it a legal right, obligation, interest or status. Therefore, the defendant can be prosecuted pursuant to PL 170.25.

The defendant was accused of selling counterfeit tickets and was charged with several counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument under PL170.25. A written instrument is purported to be any kind specified in this code section (Will, credit card, contract, etc.), or any other instrument that terminates the effects of a legal interest.

by
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

People v. M., NY Slip Op 07924

The court held that the order of the Appellate Court should be confirmed. The defendant claims that his plea of guilty was involuntary. He argued that the indictment must be dismissed because the People didn’t notify the grand jury that the defendant wished to call a particular witness. The defendant argues that the prosecutor’s conduct impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceeding and his motion to dismiss isn’t forfeited by his plea of guilty.

The Appellate Court held that the plea was entered voluntarily. When the plead guilty, he forfeited his argument that his motion to dismiss his indictment should have been granted. The court granted leave to appeal and this court affirms (29 NY3d 1130 [2017].

by
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

(People v C, NY Slip Op 06849)

The right to self-representation is an important part of being an American (People v. McIntyre 36 NY2d 10, 14 [1974]. This is a right that is guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and New York State law (Fraretta v CA 422 US 806 [1975], NY Constitution Art. 1). This right, however, isn’t absolute and must be made in a timely manner (Mc Intyre 36 NY2d; Martinez v Ct of Appeal 4th Appellate District, 528 US 152, 161-162 [2000].

In this case, the defendant tried to invoke his right to proceed pro se. There is a three-prong approach to determine when this right can be invoked. It must be made in a timely manner, there must have been an intelligent waiver of counsel, and the defendant must not have engaged in conduct which would prevent an orderly disposition of the issues. This appeal deals with the first prong of this test.

by
Posted in: and
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

People v O.X.

The court held that the Appellate Order should be affirmed in this case. The question of this case is whether a 4th amendment consent to search a premises is a question of law or fact (People v. McFarlane 21 NY 3d 1034). The court said that the voluntariness of the consent in this instance is up for dispute. Although the court’s power to review the affirmed findings of fact are limited. The findings of the trial court are supported by the record (People v Morales 42 NY2d 129, 138 [1977]).

Judge Rivera stated that there was a home visit by law enforcement for the purposes of making a warrantless arrest. It is not justified by another exception of the warrant requirement.

by
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

#6179

April 3, 2018

A judgment was originally entered against the defendant on May 31, 2017, convicting him of the charge of aggravated cruelty to animals, including torturing animals. He was sentenced to 2 years in prison, which was unanimously affirmed.

by
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

Unlawful Imprisonment in the First (NY Penal Law 135.10) and Second (NY Penal Law 135.05) Degrees:

False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of a person against her will by someone without legal authority or justification. For example, an armed bank robber yells at the customers to get down on the floor, threatening to shoot them if they try to leave. Since they know they might be killed if they try to leave, they are being held against their will. The captive bank customers may be able to claim damages, and the bank robber may be charged with the crime of false imprisonment. Even the police may be charged with false imprisonment if they exceed their authority such as detaining someone without justification.

It often takes the trained criminal eye of a New York criminal defense attorney or lawyer to locate and assess the nuances between similar statutes. Deciphering the language between similar statutes could mean the difference between facing a misdemeanor or a violent felony. One example of this found in statutes relating to Kidnapping and Unlawful Imprisonment. Although each of these statutes have their own unique language, at a basic level the difference between Kidnapping (NY Penal Law 135.20 and 125.25) and Unlawful Imprisonment (NY Penal Law 135.05 and 135.10) hinges on two key words defined by statute and interpreted by case law. Those key words are “restrain” and “abduct.” Today’s entry will address the general definitions applicable to Kidnapping and Unlawful Imprisonment. Additionally, I will give an overview of the crimes of Unlawful Imprisonment in the First and Second Degrees. At a later date I will analyze the Kidnapping statute under New York State law.

by
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

New York Penal Law 165.05 & 165.06: Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle & Your NY Criminal Defense

New York Penal Law Section 165.05 on Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, states that: A person is guilty of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree when: 1. Knowing that he does not have the consent of the owner, he takes, operates, exercises control over, rides in or otherwise uses a vehicle. A person who engages in any such conduct without the consent of the owner is presumed to know that he does not have such consent; or 2. Having custody of a vehicle pursuant to an agreement between himself or another and the owner thereof whereby he or another is to perform for compensation a specific service for the owner involving the maintenance, repair or use of such vehicle, he intentionally uses or operates the same, without the consent of the owner, for his own purposes in a manner constituting a gross deviation from the agreed purpose; or 3. Having custody of a vehicle pursuant to an agreement with the owner thereof whereby such vehicle is to be returned to the owner at a specified time, he intentionally retains or withholds possession thereof, without the consent of the owner, for so lengthy a period beyond the specified time as to render such retention or possession a gross deviation from the agreement. of a gross deviation from the agreement” shall consist of, but not be limited to, circumstances wherein a person who having had custody of a vehicle for a period of fifteen days or less pursuant to a written agreement retains possession of such vehicle for at least seven days beyond the period specified in the agreement and continues such possession for a period of more than two days after service or refusal of attempted service of a notice in person or by certified mail at an address indicated in the agreement stating (i) the date and time at which the vehicle was to have been returned under the agreement; (ii) that the owner does not consent to the continued withholding or retaining of such vehicle and demands its return; and that continued withholding or retaining of the vehicle may constitute a class A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to one thousand dollars or by a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a period of up to one year or by both such fine and imprisonment.

Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.

Continue reading

by
Published on:
Updated:
Contact Information