Articles Posted in Grand Larceny

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Sentencing for a Grand Larceny, as with most theft-related crimes, depends largely on the amount of money alleged to have been stolen by a defendant. New York Grand Larceny Charges are brought as felony criminal charges and are used to prosecute any theft over $1,000. Petit Larceny, theft under $1,000, is prosecuted as a misdemeanor offense.

The law does not outline specific sentences for the various classifications of grand larceny; rather, judges are given discretion within the limitations outlined by the statute. There are a variety of factors which will likely weigh in on a grand larceny sentencing decision; some of these such factors are:

• Prior criminal record

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When a Simple Petit Larceny or Petty Theft Becomes a Felony Grand Larceny in New York:

The laws governing larceny will usually contain sentencing options, either a list of possible sentences or a range of years, as well as fines or other alternative sentences. Judges can determine the appropriate sentence by examining the facts of the case and choosing the best penalty that falls within the bounds of the statute.

In a larceny case, the type of larceny will also greatly influence the severity of the sentence. Grand larcenies carry much longer sentences than do petit (or “petty”) larcenies. Some states also impose different sentences based on the type of item that the defendant stole.

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According to a Nassau County Grand Larceny Attorney, the defendant was originally charged with a felony violation of Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree, which was subsequently reduced to the class A misdemeanor charge of petit larceny, upon the application of the People. Subsequently, the People made an application to dismiss the misdemeanor charge in order to further the interests of justice. The People’s application was granted by the Court, and the accusatory instrument was dismissed. The People allege that the application for dismissal was made because of the People’s inability to contact the complainant. Now the People have made a motion for an order to restore the above-entitled action to the calendar to allow the People to reprosecute this case on the original felony charge of violating PL Sec. 155.30, Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree.

A Nassau County Criminal Lawyer said the Criminal Procedure Law fails to bar renewed prosecution of a misdemeanor charge that has been dismissed in the interest of justice upon the People’s motion pursuant to CPL Sec. 170.30 subd. (1)(g). However, this does not appear to be a legislative oversight since the legislature did provide for a bar to renewed prosecutions in other situations. Section 210.20 of the CPL provides that reprosecution of an indictment is barred where the indictment has been dismissed due to immunity, double jeopardy, statute of limitations, and denial of speedy trial. However, Section 210.20 provides that where an indictment had been dismissed in the interest of justice, pursuant to 210.20 subd. (1)(i), the Court may, upon application of the People, authorize the People to submit the charge to the grand jury. Accordingly, a superior court has the statutory authority to grant reprosecution of a felony charge where the indictment had been previously dismissed in the interests of justice.

A Nassau County Petit Larceny Lawyer said that, in a similar manner, the District Court should have the authority to grant reprosecution of an accusatory instrument on a misdemeanor charge where the accusatory instrument was originally dismissed in the furtherance of justice pursuant to CPL Sec. 170.30. There is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Law which forbids the reinstatement of a misdemeanor prosecution. Furthermore, there is no double jeopardy involved since double jeopardy does not attach until a witness is sworn at trial.

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A Nassau Petit Larceny Lawyer said that, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Nassau County, dated March 2, 2007, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated January 2, 2007, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, attempted robbery in the second degree (four counts), and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree (four counts), adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of two years. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review the fact-finding order dated January 2, 2007.

A Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant was charged in a four-count indictment with robbery in the second degree (two counts), grand larceny in the third degree and petit larceny. On appearing before the trial court defendant, through counsel, requested a waiver of a jury trial. Because of the fact that his educational background was rather minimal, the record indicates that defendant was queried extensively and was informed not only as to his rights, but the extent and impact of the waiver, and that he was fully aware of the fact that he was waiving a trial by jury.

The evidence presented by the presentment agency established that the appellant was part of a group of individuals who surrounded three boys, demanded money from them, searched their pockets, and hit them. The complainant arrived at the scene at some point after the incident began, and there was no evidence that any of the perpetrators directed any conduct, threats, or words toward her. Since the presentment agency failed to demonstrate that complainant was anything more than a mere spectator, the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the appellant committed acts against her which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the second degree and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree.

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A Nassau Sex Crime Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered March 22, 1990, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree, rape in the first degree, attempted rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree (two counts), sexual abuse in the first degree, burglary in the first degree (two counts), grand larceny in the second degree (two counts), burglary in the second degree, and grand larceny in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

The issue in this case is whether defendant is liable for all his criminal charges.

Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the lineup identification by an eyewitness was not the result of undue suggestiveness even though the defendant was the only person common to both the lineup and the photographic array. This court has previously explained that “procedures involving the repeated display of a single photograph in successive arrays until a positive identification is obtained are viewed with great caution by the courts”. However, the potential for irreparable misidentification is not manifest when the eyewitness views an array containing a photograph of the defendant and subsequently views the defendant in person during a lineup. Viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the pretrial identification, there is no basis in the record to disturb the determination of the hearing court. The eyewitness was unable to identify the defendant from the photographic array in which his picture appeared, but subsequently identified him from a lineup approximately one month later. This criminal procedure was not so conducive to the possibility of irreparable misidentification as to require suppression of the lineup identification.

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Defendant moves for re-sentence of a 1964 conviction in this Court. The sentence in question was ten to fifteen years in Prison for Grand Larceny, first degree, as a third felony offender. He contends that his two prior convictions (both in Washington, D.C.) do not constitute criminal felonies under Sec. 1941 of the Penal Law, which in effect provides that a court may sentence a defendant as a multiple offender if the previous crimes committed by the defendant in a foreign jurisdiction would constitute felonies if committed in New York. His moving papers and memorandum of law show extensive research and his contentions are fortified with numerous citations of authority.

It appears that in April 1946, criminal defendant was convicted of Robbery in the Second Degree, after trial in the District Court, District of Columbia, and sentenced to a term of from two to six years in prison. Again, in 1956, in the same court, upon his plea of guilty to Attempted Robbery, he was sentenced to prison for a term of from one to three years. Defendant contends, however, that the statutes under which he was convicted in the District of Columbia are not proper multiple offender predicates since the said sections define as robbery, acts, which if committed in New York would not be considered felonies.

Defendant argues that since Sec. 22-2901 provides that a robbery may be committed in the District of Columbia by ‘stealth’ but without force that they are not crimes which, if committed within this state, would be a felony and therefore are not a proper basis for sentencing as a third felony offender.

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In this criminal proceeding and action, the petitioner seeks to compel the Nassau County Board of Cooperative Educational Services (hereinafter BOCES) to pay her, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between BOCES and the BOCES Educational Administrators Association, the sum of $16,768, representing the cash value of a 40-day vacation leave balance, and pursuant to a 2004 amendment to the collective bargaining agreement, the sum of $14,252.80, representing the cash value of a 34-day vested bank vacation leave balance.

BOCES moved to dismiss the combined petition/complaint, arguing that, as a matter of public policy, the petitioner is not entitled to either payment because she pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny in the second degree for stealing its funds. The Supreme Court agreed with BOCES and dismissed the petition/complaint on the ground that BOCES was within its right to deny the petitioner’s request for a lump sum payment representing her unused and vested bank vacation leave in light of her criminal guilty plea.

The petitioner’s guilty plea did not warrant dismissal of her petition/complaint. Rather, the express provisions of the collective bargaining agreement must control. The collective bargaining agreement at issue provides that unit members employed on a twelve (12) month basis shall be entitled to twenty-two (22) days of leave with pay per calendar year to be taken as approved by the appropriate department head or his/her designee, consistent with the needs of the agency. Such annual leave shall be earned and may be accumulated from year to year, up to a maximum accumulation of forty (40) days.

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In this case, we are asked whether a three- or six-year statute of limitations applies to causes of action for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by a school district against a former member of the school board. We hold that the six-year limitations period in CPLR 213(7) is applicable and, therefore, this action was timely commenced.

In September 2002, an accounting firm hired by plaintiff XXX School District discovered irregularities in the district’s financial records. An audit revealed that Mr. GM, the assistant superintendent for business, had stolen $223,000 from district accounts. The XXX School District Board of Education (the Board) was notified of Mr. GM’s misconduct and it decided to allow Mr. GM to repay the misappropriated funds along with attorney’s fees and accounting costs and retire. The Board, however, did not notify law enforcement authorities or state officials about Mr. GM’s criminal activities, nor did it publicly disclose her illegal conduct.

Unfortunately, the theft by Mr. GM turned out to be just one component of a long-running conspiracy to loot the school district’s coffers. After Mr. GM left her post, information about additional missing funds surfaced and eventually a criminal investigation was undertaken by the Nassau County District Attorney’s Office. In June 2004, Mr. GM was arrested for grand larceny in the first degree for stealing more than $1 million from the school district. The investigation also implicated the school district’s superintendent (Mr. TX) and an account clerk (Ms. D, who was Mr. GM’s niece), and they too were arrested for grand larceny. An extensive forensic audit by the State Comptroller determined that, from 1998 through 2004, approximately $11 million had been misappropriated: Mr. GM had stolen over $4.6 million; Mr. TX had taken more than $2.4 million; and Ms. D had received about $300,000. In total, various sums had been funneled to more than two dozen people.

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The defendant appeal the judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, convicting him of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, and of grand larceny and assault, and after a jury recommendation, imposing sentence of life imprisonment on the conviction of murder in the first degree.

After the crimes were committed, the defendant fled to California, where he was arrested and searched. Immediately after the arrest, the California police searched and found two revolvers in the automobile which the defendant had rented.

The criminal defendant was interrogated in California, on the plane returning to New York after he had waived extradition, and also in Nassau County before his arraignment there. Some of the statements and confessions made before the defendant left California were made after a New York attorney, who had been retained by the defendant’s parents to represent him, communicated with the Nassau County police officials, inquired as to the defendant’s whereabouts and informed such officials that he intended to go to California and that he did not want any statements taken from the defendant.

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Defendants move for an order modifying a Grand Jury subpoena duces tecum directed to their accountant, which commands, inter alia, the production of personal income tax retuns of the defendants, FDO, Sr., MDO and GM.

Defendants move to modify item number 3 of the subpoena duces tecum directed to their accountant, which commands the accountant to produce the personal income tax retuns of FDO, MDO and GM, for the period January 1, 1985 to present.

The defendants claim that they have standing to bring this application because they are interested parties whose rights to privacy are directly at stake and the items sought are unrelated to any legitimate objective of the Grand Jury and that the District Attorney is using the Grand Jury as a fishing expedition in hope of uncovering other criminal activity. It is further argued that the request for personal tax returns should be viewed as an improper use of the subpoena power to harass defendants. In support of their privacy rights argument, the defendants claim that the subpoena violates the confidentiality provisions of the Federal Tax Reform Act of 1976 (26 U.S.C. § 6103[a] and the Secrecy provisions of the New York State Tax Law (Tax Law § 697[e].

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