Articles Posted in Grand Larceny

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Sentencing for a Grand Larceny, as with most theft-related crimes, depends largely on the amount of money alleged to have been stolen by a defendant. New York Grand Larceny Charges are brought as felony criminal charges and are used to prosecute any theft over $1,000. Petit Larceny, theft under $1,000, is prosecuted as a misdemeanor offense.

The law does not outline specific sentences for the various classifications of grand larceny; rather, judges are given discretion within the limitations outlined by the statute. There are a variety of factors which will likely weigh in on a grand larceny sentencing decision; some of these such factors are:

• Prior criminal record

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When a Simple Petit Larceny or Petty Theft Becomes a Felony Grand Larceny in New York:

The laws governing larceny will usually contain sentencing options, either a list of possible sentences or a range of years, as well as fines or other alternative sentences. Judges can determine the appropriate sentence by examining the facts of the case and choosing the best penalty that falls within the bounds of the statute.

In a larceny case, the type of larceny will also greatly influence the severity of the sentence. Grand larcenies carry much longer sentences than do petit (or “petty”) larcenies. Some states also impose different sentences based on the type of item that the defendant stole.

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Criminal tampering, applies when someone breaks a payphone, or unlawfully tampers or makes a connection with property of a gas, electric, sewer, stream, water-works, or with the property of any public carrier or a public utility operated by a municipality or district.

Under the New York Penal Law, a person is guilty of Tampering with Public Records in the Second Degree when, knowing that he does not have the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, he knowingly removes, mutilates, destroys, conceals, makes a false entry in or falsely alters any record or other written instrument filed with, deposited in, or otherwise constituting a record of a public office or public servant. Tampering with Public Records in the Second Degree is a class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in jail.

A person is guilty of Tampering with Public Records in the First Degree when, knowing that he does not have the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, and with intent to defraud, he knowingly removes, mutilates, destroys, conceals, makes a false entry in or falsely alters any record or other written instrument filed with, deposited in, or otherwise constituting a record of a public office or public servant. Tampering with Public Records in the First Degree is a class D felony punishable by up to seven years in state prison.

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In this case, Defendant has failed to allege facts that would amount to denial of effective assistance of counsel. Contrary to Defendant’s claim, it is well established that the failure to advise a criminal defendant of potential future sentence enhancements does not render a guilty plea invalid (see People v. Pierre, 80 AD3d 441 [1st Dept 2011]; People v. Watkins, 244 AD2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1997]. Moreover, a defendant need not be advised of the collateral consequences of his guilty plea such as, “loss of the right to vote or travel abroad, loss of civil service employment, loss of a driver’s license, [and] loss of the right to possess firearms” (see People v. Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 403 (1995), overruled on other grounds by People v. Peque, 22 NY3d 168 [*3](2013). [FN2] Thus, even if true, Defendant’s allegations would not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction is denied without a hearing.

In another case decision, defendant a money adviser at JP Morgan Chase, pleaded guilty earlier today to Grand Larceny after admitting she stole over $100,000 from a client. According to reports, her scheme involved creating an ATM card for the client’s account without his knowledge. At her sentencing, defendant will receive 5 years probation and shall be required to pay back her ill-gotten gains by a specified date.

As a former Manhattan prosecutor who served in the same office that prosecuted defendant, I handled Fraud and Grand Larceny cases well into the multiple millions of dollars. As a criminal defense attorney I have represented clients in Grand Larceny crimes ranging from the tens of thousands of dollars to multiple millions of dollars. Even though I have handled cases on each side of the law, every case requires a unique defense. It is likely that the “paper trail” of evidence was overwhelming in defendant’s case and her approach to the case was to try to mitigate her crime. Was defendant dealing with substance abuse or mental health issues at the time she perpetrated the crime? Did defendant show remorse for her actions? What was her ability to repay back the victim and was he “on board” with the plea? All of these issues, and many more, were likely addressed and presented favorably to the District Attorney’s Office.

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Larceny is what most people think of as common theft: it is the taking of someone else’s property without the use of force from a location other than inside their home. Car theft forms a typical instance of larceny. The offense developed under the common law, but most states that still recognize the crime of larceny have codified its elements into their penal code. While each state has its own definition of criminal larceny (or theft), most of them incorporate the following elements in some form.

The Elements of Larceny are the following:

• The unlawful taking and carrying away of Someone else’s property

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According to a Nassau County Grand Larceny Attorney, the defendant was originally charged with a felony violation of Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree, which was subsequently reduced to the class A misdemeanor charge of petit larceny, upon the application of the People. Subsequently, the People made an application to dismiss the misdemeanor charge in order to further the interests of justice. The People’s application was granted by the Court, and the accusatory instrument was dismissed. The People allege that the application for dismissal was made because of the People’s inability to contact the complainant. Now the People have made a motion for an order to restore the above-entitled action to the calendar to allow the People to reprosecute this case on the original felony charge of violating PL Sec. 155.30, Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree.

A Nassau County Criminal Lawyer said the Criminal Procedure Law fails to bar renewed prosecution of a misdemeanor charge that has been dismissed in the interest of justice upon the People’s motion pursuant to CPL Sec. 170.30 subd. (1)(g). However, this does not appear to be a legislative oversight since the legislature did provide for a bar to renewed prosecutions in other situations. Section 210.20 of the CPL provides that reprosecution of an indictment is barred where the indictment has been dismissed due to immunity, double jeopardy, statute of limitations, and denial of speedy trial. However, Section 210.20 provides that where an indictment had been dismissed in the interest of justice, pursuant to 210.20 subd. (1)(i), the Court may, upon application of the People, authorize the People to submit the charge to the grand jury. Accordingly, a superior court has the statutory authority to grant reprosecution of a felony charge where the indictment had been previously dismissed in the interests of justice.

A Nassau County Petit Larceny Lawyer said that, in similar manner, the District Court should have the authority to grant reprosecution of an accusatory instrument on a misdemeanor charge where the accusatory instrument was originally dismissed in the furtherance of justice pursuant to CPL Sec. 170.30. There is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Law which forbids the reinstatement of a misdemeanor prosecution. Furthermore, there is no double jeopardy involved since double jeopardy does not attach until a witness is sworn at trial.

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A Nassau Petit Larceny Lawyer said that, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Nassau County, dated March 2, 2007, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated January 2, 2007, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, attempted robbery in the second degree (four counts), and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree (four counts), adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of two years. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review the fact-finding order dated January 2, 2007.

A Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant was charged in a four-count indictment with robbery in the second degree (two counts), grand larceny in the third degree and petit larceny. On appearing before the trial court defendant, through counsel, requested a waiver of a jury trial. Because of the fact that his educational background was rather minimal, the record indicates that defendant was queried extensively and was informed not only as to his rights, but the extent and impact of the waiver, and that he was fully aware of the fact that he was waiving a trial by jury.

The evidence presented by the presentment agency established that the appellant was part of a group of individuals who surrounded three boys, demanded money from them, searched their pockets, and hit them. The complainant arrived at the scene at some point after the incident began, and there was no evidence that any of the perpetrators directed any conduct, threats, or words toward her. Since the presentment agency failed to demonstrate that complainant was anything more than a mere spectator, the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the appellant committed acts against her which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the second degree and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree.

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If the law and rules permit a reinstatement application, which we are required to entertain, then in most cases the applicant should be entitled to a hearing. This is certainly such a case, where the Disciplinary Committee itself originally saw the need for further investigation and hearings to determine the crucial questions of the extent of restitution and the possible influence of alcohol on the actions initially leading to disbarment. Nothing of substance changed, between the 1983 application and the instant re-argument motion, to warrant a change of the Committee’s position with respect thereto.

There is plainly a question of fact as to the extent of restitution and the efforts to conclude a disposition with respect thereto. The dissent clearly demonstrates there is such an issue. An evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the issue. Granting a criminal hearing does not imply that reinstatement will follow, as the dissent suggests. Our obligation to conform to procedural safeguards in disciplinary proceedings is now beyond doubt.

We must, to the extent possible, apply the rules and guidelines consistently. In one case, we held the application for reinstatement in abeyance and directed a hearing to determine whether the applicant now possessed the requisite character and fitness to practice law. The Disciplinary Committee favored further investigation and a hearing on the application of Levine, who had also consented to disbarment. The differences between the two cases would seem to militate more strongly in favor of a further hearing in this case. Whereas petitioner herein was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor of petit larceny as a result of his conversion of funds, Levine was disbarred after conviction for the federal felony of bribing a public official. Obviously one who bribes a public official cannot make restitution. But, as we have held, he is entitled to a hearing on his application for reinstatement. One who has been disbarred as a consequence of the conversion of a client’s funds, and who claims to have made or attempted to make restitution, is equally entitled to a hearing. It is noted that whereas petitioner was disbarred sixteen years ago, Levine made his application for reinstatement little more than seven and one-half years after his disbarment.

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On February 2, 1984, declining the invitation for further investigation and hearings, we denied this second application for reinstatement, again without opinion. Petitioner now moves for re-argument or renewal, or at least for an explanation for our denial of a hearing, to which the Committee had previously been amenable. In the alternative, petitioner asks for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. This time, the Departmental disciplinary Committee flatly opposes the motion on purely procedural grounds.

The issue in this criminal case is whether he is entitled to a hearing to demonstrate his entitlement to reinstatement.

On the question of character and fitness, petitioner has presented an impressive array of affidavits attesting to his rehabilitation and present good character, including affidavits from the former and present Nassau County labor commissioners and a United States Senator. Petitioner asks for a hearing to demonstrate his character and fitness to resume practice of law.

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This is a motion for re-argument of our recent order denying a second application for reinstatement to practice law. A Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, petitioner, 55 years old, was admitted to practice in this department in 1955. In 1968 he was disbarred after a complaint that he had converted a considerable sum of money constituting the legacy of the estate of his wife’s aunt, which he had represented. Petitioner had voluntarily offered his resignation in the face of this criminal charge. In 1969, after his disbarment, he was indicted for grand larceny first degree in connection with this conversion of funds, and in 1971 he was convicted of the Class A misdemeanor of petit larceny on the basis of a negotiated plea. He was sentenced to three years probation with a condition of continued restitution. He was discharged from probation in November 1974.

Since his disbarment he has worked as an editor for West Publishing Co., operated a hobby supply shop, worked as a salesman, and since 1977 has been employed in the Nassau County Labor Department, since May 1979 as assistant to the Director of Labor Relations. His prior difficulties precluded him from obtaining employment as an insurance agent or as a commodity futures dealer. Petitioner has been active in local civic, service, charitable, religious and political organizations. In 1977 he was licensed as a real estate sales person and commissioned as a notary public.

A Nassau Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, petitioner initially applied for reinstatement in 1980. His application was supported in part by affirmations and affidavits of four attorneys, including a retired justice of the Appellate Division, Second Department, attesting to his upstanding life over the preceding several years, his good standing in the community, his stable family life, abstention from alcohol since at least 1973 and his diligence, integrity, loyalty and commitment to responsibility in the employ of the Nassau County government. His application at that time was opposed by the Departmental Disciplinary Committee in part on the ground that petitioner had failed to make sufficient restitution. We denied the application at that time without granting an evidentiary hearing to explore the question (79 A.D.2d 550).

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