Articles Posted in Petite Larceny

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A Queens Shoplifting Lawyer said that, this case before the court involves a supermarket owner (the complainant) who, while manning the checkout register near the exit, saw the defendant go past him with an armful of meat, subsequently estimated at $30 worth. When he called out, defendant quickened his pace and left the store. The owner took off after him, gave chase around the corner, and saw defendant enter a car. The motor was running. As the complainant paused to jot down the license plate number, the meat was thrown from the car. While this was happening a police patrol car came upon the scene. In a matter of seconds defendant and co-defendant (who was at the wheel of the car) were under arrest, charged with the Class A misdemeanor of petit larceny.

A Queens Petit Larceny Lawyer said that, at the preliminary hearing the complainant testified that the meat, once repossessed, was cleaned, re-wrapped and sold in the regular course of the supermarket’s business. The meat obviously was not produced at the hearing, which took place three weeks after the incident. Such tags as it may have had, identifying its ownership or other information, were lost sight of and were never produced in court.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, at the close of the preliminary hearing the defendants now move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the People have failed to meet the obligation to establish reasonable cause for the arrest, as required by Section 170.75, subdivision 3(a) of the Criminal Procedure Law. Although they admit that it would have been inappropriate, perhaps, to bring such perishable property into court, they contend that the prosecution had an obligation to bring in and introduce memorandum tags of ownership as a prerequisite to oral testimony of ownership. In the alternative, they claim that the People should have been required, before oral testimony of ownership could be admitted, to give a satisfactory explanation for their failure to produce such tags. To this end they invoke the functional definition of the best evidence rule as requiring ‘that whenever a party seeks to prove the contents of a writing, he must produce the original of the writing or satisfactorily account for its absence.’

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This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, convicting him of rape in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

A Queens County Criminal lawyer said that despite the fact that a review of the record demonstrates that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction in this case, reversal is mandated because of the substantial probability that various errors influenced the jury’s verdict.

Evidence of defendant’s guilt was based solely upon eyewitness identification testimony. Defendant proffered an alibi, and the defense theory was that the defendant had been misidentified. During the cross-examination of both of defendant’s alibi witnesses, the prosecutor elicited testimony that both had failed to respond to a letter from the District Attorney’s office and otherwise did not come forward and disclose any information with respect to the alibi to law enforcement authorities. Contrary to the proper procedure prescribed in this type of matter, the court made no attempt to determine at a bench conference the reason for such failure on the part of the alibi witnesses to have come forward to law enforcement authorities, nor did it make any effort to determine whether there existed a good faith basis for the prosecutor’s questioning in this regard.

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These are two juvenile delinquency proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 3. Appellant appeals are from (1) a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Queens County, which, after a fact-finding hearing, found that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of resisting arrest, (2) an order of disposition of the same court, which, upon the fact-finding order, and a second fact-finding order of the same court, after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree and petit larceny adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of 12 months, and (3) an amended order of disposition of the same court. The appeal from the amended order of disposition, brings up for review the fact-finding order.

A Queens County Criminal attorney said that the orders appealed from arose from two separate incidents. In March 2003 the appellant was arrested for disorderly conduct; the charge was subsequently changed to resisting arrest. In August 2003 the appellant was arrested again, this time for shoplifting.

With respect to the first incident, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, the Court find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which, had they been committed by an adult, would have constituted resisting arrest.

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A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, at about 3:30 A.M. on June 17, 1972, a girl of 15, was brutally knifed in the chest while sleeping in her ground floor bedroom. Before expiring, the girl told her parents (who had rushed to the room in response to her scream) that the assailant had stabbed her through an open window. Four days later, defendant was arrested for the crime and allegedly re-enacted the murder three times at the police precinct house and a fourth time at the scene of the crime itself. It was shortly discovered that defendant was being sought in connection with an existing indictment for attempted murder and some lesser crimes, that he had been adjudicated incompetent to stand trial on that indictment, and that following confinement to various mental institutions, he had been released in February of 1972 without the sanction of law enforcement authorities. Two weeks after the arrest for the slaying, the defendant’s appointed attorney agreed to the delivery of his client to the District Attorney’s office for further interrogation. During the course of two examinations at the prosecutor’s office, defendant is said to have re-enacted numerous murders and assaults. More than two years later, after trial by jury, the defendant was convicted on his earlier indictment. At a bench trial which followed, he was convicted of murder.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, the first of the judgments appealed stems from events which occurred in Woodhaven in Queens County during the pre-dawn hours of September 5, 1971. The defendant originally was apprehended when two police officers, searching for a prowler, came upon him walking the street in dark clothes. When asked for identification, he allegedly responded by attempting to shoot one of the officers. The gun having misfired, the policemen wrestled the six-foot and four-inch defendant to the ground, disarmed him, and discovered that he possessed an automobile license, registration, and Social Security card in the name of a certain individual. Awakened by the police, the owner of the Social Security card related that before retiring she placed her purse containing the three documents on the dining room table next to a closed window. Not only was the purse missing, but the window was open and the table cloth had been pulled the length of the table toward it.

A Queens Petit Larceny Lawyer said that, the defendant was indicted for attempted murder, reckless endangerment in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, possession of weapons, etc., as a felony, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, and petit larceny, but after being jailed for 10 days and confined at the Kings County State Hospital for six to seven weeks, he was adjudicated incompetent to stand trial. Further successive confinements in two other mental institutions terminated with the defendant’s release by Mental Hygiene officials in February, 1972, without notice to the proper authorities.

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A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant seeks an order restraining the District Attorney from cross-examining him regarding specific prior convictions. A hearing was held on September 12, 1973 and the Court determined the facts to be as follows: The defendant herein was indicted by a Queens County Grand Jury and charged with two counts of robbery in the first degree, assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the sixth degree. His counsel has placed before the Court the fact that the defendant has a prior criminal history, alleging: 1. That defendant in 1967 was granted youthful offender treatment in connection with a charge of possessing a prescription unlawfully; 2. A year later, in April 1968, defendant was arrested for robbery in the first degree and pleaded guilty to petit larceny in November; 3. On February 14, 1972 defendant was arrested on a charge of possession of a weapon and loitering and was sentenced to a conditional discharge after pleading guilty to loitering.

A Queens Petit Larceny Lawyer said that, defendant now moves to ‘restrain the District Attorney and preclude the people from introducing any evidence’ with regard to the above convictions or the underlying acts which gave rise to them. It is his contention that, while the People would allegedly offer such convictions solely to impeach his credibility as a witness, the practical result would be to establish his guilt in relation to the present crimes. In effect, such evidence would influence the jury to believe that the man now on trial is either a habitual criminal or has a specific propensity for the crime of robbery with which he is now being charged. The defendant concludes that, because of this, the probative value of impeachment of his credibility is clearly outweighed by the prejudicial value before a jury. This, in defendant’s mind, constitutes a denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial.

A Queens Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, the People, first, dispute the facts of defendant’s final conviction, pointing out that their records show that defendant on February 14, 1972 was indicted for possession of a weapon, pleaded guilty to same and received a sentence of probation for three years. Next, they attacked the logic of his contentions, maintaining that the defendant has offered no legal basis to support them; nor cited any pertinent Supreme Court decision to establish the alleged violation of constitutional rights. Further, it is submitted that the defendant has presented no facts of any kind, other than the bare recital of his prior criminal history, which might indicate substantial prejudice or show unique harm by the admission of such crimes before a jury.

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A man filed an appeal from a judgment convicting him of burglary in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and petit larceny, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial of that branch of the man’s motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

The appellate division stated that the hearing court’s denial of the man’s motion to suppress the items seized from his person should not be reversed. It was further stated that the decision was supported by the record, which established that the stop and inspection of the man at the scene of the crime was founded upon a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the crime and that he was armed and could be dangerous.

Sources revealed that to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the facts from which the inference of the offender’s guilt is drawn must be established with certainty, be inconsistent with his innocence, and exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis other than guilt.

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A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, on October 26, 1965, after having been adjudicated a Youthful Offender under indictment 411–65 which charged him with robbery in the second degree, defendant was sentenced to Elmira Reception Center for an indefinite term. On April 18, 1967 defendant was released on parole from that sentence.

A Queens Petit Larceny Lawyer said that, while on parole, and on May 6, 1967, defendant was arrested for robbery and he was subsequently indicted for that crime by indictment 1010–67. On October 27, 1967, on his plea of guilty to assault in the third degree and petit larceny to cover that indictment, defendant was sentenced to Elmira Reception Center for an indefinite term. Defendant was received at Elmira under the latter sentence on November 2, 1967. Thereupon the Parole Board, after a hearing, adjudged defendant a parole violator on the 1965 sentence. It charged him with 11 months and 27 days delinquent time on that sentence and ordered that he serve the full delinquent time (which would expire on October 29, 1968) before commencing service of the 1967 sentence imposed.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, on May 29, 1968, after defendant had served a portion of the said delinquent time and before he had commenced to serve the 1967 sentence, the Court of Appeals decided defendant’s appeal from the 1965 judgment. That disposition created an anomalous situation and triggered the developments which led to the muddled situation which exists here.

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A Queens Petit Larceny Lawyer said that, the defendant is charged with one count each of assault in the third degree, petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and harassment in the second degree.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, in the accusatory instrument, the security officer for Conway Department Store, stated that on July 5, 2010, he observed the defendant remove a toy and three pieces of chocolate from the store shelves, place the items into a black plastic bag and leave the store without paying for the merchandise. The security officer also stated that he apprehended the defendant outside the store and recovered the merchandise from defendant’s black plastic bag. He so stated that the defendant did not have permission or authority to take, remove, use, possess, or otherwise exercise control over said merchandise without paying for it. He also stated that as he stopped the defendant, she became upset and grabbed a metal rod striking him on the head causing a cut to his head, bleeding and substantial pain. He also stated that he sought medical treatment at a local hospital and received stitches to his head. Police Officer recovered the metal rod from inside the store.

A Queens Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, at the time of the incident, an eye witness telephoned 911. According to the defendant, the caller stated that a young man was beating up an elderly woman. The defendant maintains this witness’ account of the incident is exculpatory and has requested that the People turn over the caller’s name, address and telephone number. On February 18, 2011, the People gave a copy of the 911 call to the defendant without the identifying information of the caller. At that time, the Honorable Judge directed the People to provide the defendant access to the Brady material, meaning the caller’s contact information. On April 18, 2011, this court directed the People to provide the defendant with the contact information of the witness/telephone caller. At the time of the filing of defendant’s motion, August 17, 2011, the People had not turned over such information to the defendant.

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A man has been charged with grand larceny in the third and fourth degrees, forgery in the second degree, criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree and petit larceny. It is also alleged that the man executed forged savings account withdrawal slips on six separate occasions thereby stealing a total of $3,400.00.

By decision, the criminal court found that legally sufficient evidence was presented to sustain each of the offenses charged in the indictment. Yet, the court reserved decision on the man’s motion to dismiss the indictment because of its concern for the integrity of the grand jury process, based upon the possible impropriety of the prosecutor’s legal instructions to the grand jury. More specifically, the court questioned the legality of the prosecutor specifically directing the grand jury to disregard exculpatory testimonial evidence of a non-identification of the man at a line-up, after the prosecutor had unilaterally introduced the evidence through the testimony of an alleged eyewitness.

The alleged eyewitness was the former branch manager of a banking institution in which the subject transactions allegedly occurred. After testifying that there were times that he performed the functions of a teller, he was shown three share withdrawal receipts pertaining to four withdrawal transactions that had occurred. By referring to the listed teller identification number on each of those receipts, the witness testified that he performed the four subject transactions, totaling $2,400.00 in withdrawals from the savings account. The witness was then questioned by the prosecutor about his presence and participation in a lineup at the police precinct.

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The defendant is charged with violating the Penal Law, Menacing in the Second Degree and Disorderly Conduct.

The People seek to introduce, and the defendant seeks to suppress, a written statement given by the defendant to the Port Authority Police. A Huntley hearing was held before Judicial Hearing Officer. The People called three witnesses. The defendant did not call any witnesses. The Court has reviewed the hearing transcript, the criminal court file and memoranda of law submitted by the People and the defendant to the Judicial Hearing Officer. Based upon the foregoing, and the recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this court adopts the Judicial Hearing Officer’s Findings of Fact, but modifies in part the Conclusions of Law, by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the statement he gave to the Port Authority police.

The testimony adduced at the hearing reveals the charges in this action originate from a traffic dispute that occurred on the morning of August 14, 1997. The two complainants allege that a man followed them off the highway into a parking lot near building 14 at John F. Kennedy International Airport, their place of employment. They further stated that the man proceeded to threaten them while brandishing a handgun. The complainant’s supervisor is alleged to have witnessed the incident.

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