Robbery

Published on: June 22, 2013

One criminal act produces two crimes

by Stephen Bilkis

The Facts of the Case:

A building containing offices and retail establishments was broken into and burglarized. Moments after the silent alarm system went off, the appellants, along with a third person, were found inside including various tools that were apparently used in the burglary. Consequently, appellants were charged and convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, viz: grand larceny, petit larceny and possession of burglary tools. They were each sentenced to fifteen years for the breaking and entering conviction, 60 days in the county jail for the petit larceny, and five years for the possession of burglary tools, the latter to run consecutive to the former concurrent sentences.

The appellants now ask the court for a reversal of their convictions and sentences and argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the conviction of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny; that the trial court erred in disallowing the testimony of an alleged material witness; and that the trial court erred in imposing three separate sentences for the three offenses inasmuch as the petit larceny and possession of burglary tools were but facets or phases of the breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny.

Published on: February 4, 2013

Defendant Charged with Aiding and Abetting Robbery

by Stephen Bilkis

The accused man along with a co-accused was convicted of robbery in the first degree. He and his co-accused had been charged with aiding and abetting the actual perpetrator; and the sole evidence linking the accused to the robbery was his own admissions. The evidence was insufficient to establish the accused man’s guilt of robbery as a principal.

The accused man’s admissions established only that he had given a gun to his co-accused who, in the accused man’s presence, then turned it over to their actual perpetrator man, whom they knew was going to use it in a robbery; and that after the robbery, and an ensuing homicide in which a police officer was killed, the accused cut his actual perpetrator’s hair in an effort to help him evade capture. It is indisputable that the accused was never present during the actual commission of the robbery and it is not claimed that he ever shared in the robbery proceeds.

Clearly, the accused did intentionally render assistance to the actual perpetrator. However, to be criminally liable for the robbery itself, he must also be shown to have shared the same specific intent or mental culpability as the actual perpetrator, and this was not done. The transfer of the weapon to the actual perpetrator, without more, is at best equivocal; and the subsequent cutting of the actual perpetrator’s hair is of little or no probative value, since it was the intervening killing of a police officer and not the robbery which obviously gave rise to the extensive manhunt. In other words, while the accused may be guilty of other crimes, such as criminal facilitation and hindering prosecution, the circumstantial evidence was not at all inconsistent with his innocence of the crime of robbery itself.

Published on: January 20, 2013

Court Says Probable Cause May Be Supplied in Part by Hearsay Information

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered October 21, 1993, convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), robbery in the first degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of the branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by the defendant to law enforcement officials.

The issue in this case is whether the defendant is entitled to the suppression of his statements made to the law enforcement officials.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said in this gun crime case, the Court said that, the People established that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant without a warrant. Probable cause may be supplied, in whole or in part, through hearsay information. Under the Aguilar- Spinelli rule, when probable cause is predicated in whole or in part upon the hearsay statement of an informant, it must be demonstrated that (1) the informant disclosed a sufficient basis for his or her knowledge, and (2) the informant was reliable. Further, the basis-of-knowledge and veracity requirements of Aguilar- Spinelli are analytically independent and each must be satisfied separately. “Information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of a specific crime is legally sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest.

Published on: January 19, 2013

Court Discusses Legal Elements of Rape Crime

by Stephen Bilkis

On December 10, 1980, two men armed with a shot gun entered a fast food restaurant in Nassau County. They threatened the employees with bodily harm if they did not hand over the cash in the cash box. When the two female employees handed to the two armed men all the cash from the cash box, the men forced the women to go outside the restaurant. They forced the women to ride in their car which was parked outside the restaurant.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the two armed men drove for twenty minutes from the fast food restaurant in Nassau County to a dead end street somewhere in Suffolk County. During the drive, the men took turns feeling up the women’s skirts and shirts. The men fondled the women’s breasts and sex organs.

When they got to the dead end street in Suffolk County, the men took turns raping the two women. When the men were exhausted, they threatened the women and their families with death should they report the rapes to the police. The two men then let the two women go.

Published on: January 16, 2013

Consent to Search Questioned

by Stephen Bilkis

Seldom has this Court considered a more spectacular or bizarre case than this habeas corpus petition of an experienced Texas criminal lawyer, former mayor of the City of Pasadena, Texas, who was found guilty in Texas State Court of being the mastermind and accomplice in an especially brutal and horrible assault and robbery, but who contends that he was invalidly convicted in violation of federal constitutional rights.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, S.H. is presently serving a sixty-year sentence imposed by the Criminal District Court of Harris County, Texas. A jury found him guilty in a separate trial as an accomplice to the crime of robbery by firearms, committed by principals J.Y., C.S., and S.H. SH has appealed from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.

On appeal Hoover has asserted two claims of error to the denial below of his habeas corpus petition based on federal constitutional grounds. First, he contends that the Court erred in refusing to sustain alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The State Trial Court admitted into evidence two diamonds seized from SH’s home during a nighttime search conducted by the Houston Police Department. SH argues that the search was made without his voluntary consent, by police officers acting under color of a search warrant which was invalid. Secondly, SH asserts that his right to confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments was infringed when the State Trial Court admitted into evidence the oral confession of alleged principal and co-indictee CS. The confession, which also implicated SH as an accomplice, was admitted during the testimony of Officer C. V. Stone to whom CS confessed, pursuant to a well-established Texas exception to the hearsay rule which allows the confession of a principal to be admitted at the trial of an accomplice to prove the principal’s guilt, proof of such guilt being a necessary prerequisite to conviction of an accomplice to the offense.

Published on: December 22, 2012

Defendant Charged with Two Crimes from Single Conversion of Money

by Stephen Bilkis

In this criminal case, appellant, was charged by information with robbery under section 812.13(2), Florida Statutes (1981) (Count I), and with grand theft, second degree, under section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1981) (Count II). The facts adduced at trial indicated that appellant and two other males had shopped lift a convenience store in Orlando by force, carrying away a cash register (valued at $250) which contained less than $50 in cash. The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts, and appellant was subsequently adjudicated guilty of both robbery and grand theft, second degree. An Orlando Criminal Lawyer said that, the trial court sentenced appellant only on the robbery count, presumably on the authority of the extant rule at that time.

An New York Criminal Lawyer said that, appellant raises three points on appeal: the trial court’s denial of proffered impeachment evidence, the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and a claim of double jeopardy in regard to the dual convictions.

The issue in this case is whether appellant’s appeal that he raises in his three points should be granted.

Published on: November 29, 2012

Court Discusses the Elements of Conspiracy

by Stephen Bilkis

This involves a case where the court dismissed the indictment against defendants for conspiracy in the fourth degree (two counts), hindering prosecution in the third degree (two counts) and official misconduct (two counts).

a New York Criminal Lawyer said that in the early 1960s, JF, a resident of Queens County and meter reader for a company, entered upon a scheme under which he accepted money from various investors, agreeing to pay them a return of 1% A week and explaining to them that this high return was being paid by a factoring company which loaned out moneys to various companies in the fur, textile and other industries where there was a need for immediate cash. In fact, there was no factoring company and JF was merely repaying these people from their own moneys. Among the hundreds of persons who invested with him were members of the staff of the District Attorney of Queens County, including defendants.

In March of 1971, after being the victim of a real or apparent robbery, and being ostensibly unable to continue to pay off investors, JF fled New York City and went to San Francisco. His whereabouts were unknown to the authorities until a year later, when he was discovered by two irate investors and was returned to New York City by them. Within two weeks, he was indicted for 35 counts of grand larceny by a Queens County Grand Jury upon presentation of the case by the District Attorney’s office. At that time, defendant was the District Attorney of Queens County, his son-in-law, was the Deputy Chief Assistant District Attorney and another defendant was a County Detective in the District Attorney’s office.

Published on: September 29, 2012

Appellant Argues Sentencing Guidelines were Inaccurate

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case, a New York Criminal Lawyer said the Appellant sought review of the sentences imposed based upon inaccurate sentencing guidelines scoresheet, and a written probation order that included a condition which was not pronounced orally at the sentencing hearing.

The court reversed the sentence imposed and remanded the case for resentencing.

The predicate offenses, kidnapping and armed robbery with a weapon, were committed June 8, 1990. The guidelines scoresheet used at sentencing shows a total of 316 points, for a recommended sentencing range of twelve to seventeen years, and a permitted sentencing range of nine to twenty-two years. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years on the kidnapping conviction, and a probationary term of twenty years on the armed robbery with a weapon conviction. The probation was to be served consecutively to the kidnapping sentence.

Published on: September 28, 2012

Court Hears Juvenile Robber Case

by Stephen Bilkis

This case is about an appeal filed by a juvenile from an adjudication of delinquency for robbery and a subsequent commitment to the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.

The central question presented for review is whether the state established a prima facie case that the respondent juvenile employed force, violence, assault or putting in fear–an essential element of robbery–in effecting a theft of jewelry from a three-year-old child.

The respondent was charged in a petition for delinquency before the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit with the offense of robbery.

Published on: August 26, 2012

Defendant is Charged with Robbery

by Stephen Bilkis

The Facts:

In the early fall of 1986, defendant-appellant and his friend travelled from the friend’s home in Fort Lauderdale, Florida to New York. On 10 October 1986, defendant-appellant dropped his friend off at a shopping mall on Long Island, New York. When he returned a few hours later, he told his friend that he had robbed a bank during his absence. The friend noticed red stains on the interior of defendant-appellant’s car, which later proved to have come from a red dye bomb attached to the stolen money bags. A New York Criminal Lawyer said after defendant-appellant rejoined his friend, they, the couple, used some of the stolen money to pay for lodging in a local hotel.

On 13 October 1986, or three days later, defendant-appellant was arrested by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and detectives of the Suffolk County, New York Police Department. He was charged under New York state law with the armed robbery. Defendant-appellant’s friend was also apprehended by the FBI. She immediately agreed to cooperate with their investigation of defendant-appellant, and several days later testified before a New York state grand jury in connection with both the 10 October 1986 bank robbery and another robbery allegedly committed by defendant-appellant in 2 September 1986. Defendant-appellant’s friend was not charged in either of these crimes, and returned home to Fort Lauderdale after her appearance before the grand jury.