New York Criminal Lawyer Blog

Published on: April 28, 2014

This is an Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County…

by Stephen Bilkis

This is an Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, convicting him of murder in the second degree, burglary in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

A Suffolk County Criminal attorney said that in May 2007, the defendant and four other individuals were arrested and charged with, inter alia, murder in the second degree, burglary in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, for their alleged involvement in stealing a wrist watch and marijuana from the home of the victim, who was shot and killed during the course of the burglary in May 2007. The four codefendants entered into plea agreements, while the defendant proceeded to a jury trial.

In a pretrial omnibus motion, the defendant moved, inter alia, for a hearing. The People consented to the hearing and in their papers, stated that “[i]f the People intend to introduce testimony of the defendant’s prior bad acts, we will move the Court, in a written application, with adequate notice to defense counsel.” In an order dated March 11, 2008, the Supreme Court granted the defendant’s request for a hearing to be conducted immediately prior to trial. However, no hearing was held, and the People never notified the defendant of their intention to impeach his credibility with respect to any prior criminal, vicious, or immoral acts.

Published on: April 28, 2014

People v Batista

by Stephen Bilkis

People v Batista

Court Discusses Whether the Defendant Fulfilled the Requirements for the Judge to give the Jury a Missing Witness Charge Instruction

The defendant was arrested and indicted for driving while intoxicated as a felony DWI, unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle and unlawful possession of marijuana. The charges arose when the defendant drove into a parked car after reversing through an intersection. The accident was witnessed by the owner of damaged car and another person came to call the police. The police officer upon arrival observed that the defendant had bloodshot watery eyes, slurred speech, was unsteady on his feet and had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. The defendant took a chemical test and registered a .141 blood alcohol content. The defendant also did not have a valid license to operate the motor vehicle and possessed marijuana. A jury convicted the defendant of counts and he appealed. The defendant appealed on the grounds that the court failed to give a missing witness charge and prosecutorial misconduct.

Published on: April 26, 2014

Grand Jury was never specifically informed

by Stephen Bilkis

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant moves, at the commencement of his jury trial, for this Court to re-inspect the Grand Jury minutes and dismiss the Indictment. The defendant herein is charged with Murder in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree. He alleges that his Indictment was improperly secured by virtue of the fact that the Assistant District Attorney failed to inform the Grand Jury that there was a cooperation agreement made by the District Attorney’s Office with a People’s witness. In addition, the defendant now maintains that the Grand Jury was not charged as to the legal requirement of corroborative evidence, pursuant to section 60.22 of the Criminal Procedure Law.

A Queens Drug Crime Lawyer said that, the People submit opposing papers which assert that the jury was properly advised as to corroboration, and while acknowledging that they did not inform the jury of the cooperation agreement, assert that they are under no obligation to inform the Grand Jury of such an agreement.

Upon the case being presented to the Grand Jury, People’s witness, who allegedly planned the murder, testified that he was the chief of the security force of a major drug crime gang and that he would, from time to time, assassinate individuals upon the orders of his superiors. In particular, he testified that he received orders from his superiors to have the victim herein, assassinated. He went on to state to the Grand Jury that the defendant, was one of the men involved in the killing and that he was present in a van used to transport the team of “hit” men to the place of execution.

Published on: April 26, 2014

People v Bolson

by Stephen Bilkis

People v Bolson

Court Discusses Whether a Family Member can be classified as a victim within the meaning of Section 390.30 (3) (b) of the CPL

The defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated but acquitted of manslaughter and vehicular assault. The defendant’s Queens County Criminal Attorney during the sentencing hearing made an objection regarding the inclusion of a victim impact statement in the presentence report by the family of the deceased. It was argued by the defendant’s counsel that report was not necessary because the defendant was acquitted on the charges involving the deceased. It was further contended that the letter was improperly communicated to the court by the deceased family and should not be considered by the court in determining his sentence.

Published on: April 25, 2014

People correctly concede

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a Criminal case where the Court rendered a decision revoking a sentence of probation previously imposed by the County Court, Suffolk County, upon a finding that he violated a condition thereof, upon his admission, and imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon his previous conviction of grand larceny in the third degree.

A Suffolk County Grand larceny attorney said that in January 2001, the defendant was sentenced in the County Court, Suffolk County, upon his plea of guilty to grand larceny in the third degree, to a term of six months imprisonment and five years probation. The sentencing court acknowledged that the defendant was in custody and would receive credit for time served and, on appeal, the People acknowledge that the defendant was taken into custody on August 31, 2000.

Thereafter, in 2005, a declaration of delinquency was filed in the Supreme Court, Kings County, alleging that the defendant had violated a condition of his probation. During the violation of probation hearing, the defendant claimed that since he had served time in prison before pleading guilty and the term of probation ran concurrently with the term of imprisonment, the probationary period began to run in August 2000, the date he was taken into custody, and expired prior to the filing of the declaration of delinquency. The Department of Probation argued that the term of probation began to run from the date the sentence was imposed.

Published on: April 25, 2014

SORA is reasonable

by Stephen Bilkis

A Suffolk Criminal Lawyer said that, the defendant appears before this Court having pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to the crime of Enticement of A Minor To Engage In Sexual Activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422[b] in satisfaction of a six count indictment also charging defendant with, among other crimes, Distribution of Child Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(1) and Possession of Child Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(5)(B). The defendant was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of sixty months to be followed by five years of supervised release and will be monitored by a Federal Probation Officer for the duration of that five year term. Pursuant to Correction Law §168-n, a “Risk Level Assessment” hearing was held before this Court on May 15, 2009 to determine the defendant’s level of community notification.

The Court has considered the Risk Assessment Instrument and Case Summary prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (the “Board”), a packet of materials which includes the defendant’s federal pre-sentence investigation report submitted by the defendant’s Federal Probation Officer to the Board, the arguments of both the People and defense counsel, a memorandum of law submitted by defense counsel and the Court’s observations of the defendant during the hearing.

A Suffolk Felony Lawyer said that, a short recitation of the operable facts leading to the defendant’s conviction, as culled from the record before the Court, is necessary. On July 26, 2004 the Dallas, Texas division of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (F.B.I.) learned that the defendant, using the screen name/email address “kels4eval@yahoo.com”, was using the internet to solicit young adolescent girls for sexual encounters. The F.B.I. later learned that the screen name was registered to the criminal defendant. An undercover agent accessed the internet using the screen name “maddies2cute,” a nom de plume for a twelve-year-old girl. For approximately two weeks the defendant engaged in sexually explicit on-line conversations with the girl at times sending her photographs depicting pornography and exposing his penis to her through the use of a web-cam. On August 5, 2004 the defendant arranged to meet the girl and her thirteen-year-old friend at a Dallas hotel to engage in sexual conduct. The next day the defendant drove to the hotel, but left after he was unable to get a room. He was arrested shortly thereafter.

Published on: April 25, 2014

Feng v. Tao

by Stephen Bilkis

Feng v. Tao

Court Discusses Summary Judgment Motion in a Four Chain Car Accident

The plaintiff was involved in a four-car chain car accident while stationary at the red light. The first defendant requested summary judgment as he asserted that he was not liable for the injuries the plaintiff suffered as his motor vehicle which was behind the plaintiff was propelled into the vehicle. The defendant also claimed that the fourth driver was convicted for driving while intoxicated DWI as a result the accident occurred because of his negligence in failing to maintain a proper lookout, failing to maintain a proper speed and failing to keep a safe distance from the vehicle in front. The third driver moved for a cross motion for summary judgment as they were not liable for the accident as the drunken driver struck their vehicle.

Published on: April 24, 2014

Nassau County Police Form 38

by Stephen Bilkis

In this Criminal action, at about 3:40 on the morning in October 1989, defendant was involved in an automobile accident on Grand Avenue in Balwin, Nassau County. A Police Officer responded to the scene and approached the defendant’s vehicle.

A Nassau County Criminal lawyer said that the Police Officer told the defendant to relax and not move because there was a piece of glass imbedded in his neck. When an ambulance arrived, defendant walked to the ambulance which drove him to the hospital. Defendant testified that he lost consciousness on his way to the hospital. Clearly, however, he was not handcuffed or in any other way restrained.

At the hospital, the defendant was taken to the Emergency Room. The Police Officer who rode with him in the ambulance accompanied him to the Emergency Room and remained with him. The Police Officer testified that there came a point at which he read the defendant the Nassau County Police Form 38 warning as to the consequences of his refusal to submit to a blood test and the defendant indicated that he understood. The defendant wrote “consent” on the form and signed it.

Published on: April 22, 2014

New York City Penitentiary

by Stephen Bilkis

A Queens Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, after a jury trial, appellants were convicted of grand larceny in the first degree (two counts), conspiracy to commit grand larceny, forgery in the third degree, and conspiracy to commit forgery; and appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit grand larceny, forgery in the third degree, and conspiracy to commit forgery. In addition, the jury also found the Forest Hills General Hospital guilty, but acquitted three other codefendants.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, the theory of the prosecutor’s case was that appellants, three of whom were officers and stockholders of the Forest Hills General Hospital and one of whom was its accountant, conspired to defraud and did defraud the Associated Hospital Service of New York (hereinafter referred to as ‘Blue Cross’) by misrepresenting the actual operating costs of the hospital. This scheme was accomplished by disguising dividend payments to the hospital’s stockholders as salaries for services performed, through false entries in the hospital’s books and records and by means of false financial statements filed with Blue Cross.

The issue in this case is whether appellants’ guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Published on: April 20, 2014

Consequently, the court ordered to deny the motion of the offender

by Stephen Bilkis

At approximately 3:00 P.M., three men wearing hooded sweatshirts entered a restaurant. The men waited by the door for a few minutes until all of the customers left. One of the men then approached the register and placed an order. After receiving the order, the three men went into the bathroom. A few moments later, two of the men returned to the register, and at that time, according to a cashier, the taller of the two men, who was wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt, pulled out a gun and instructed her to give them all of her money.

The cashier testified at the trial that she was approximately 5’6 1/2 tall and that the man was much taller than she was, probably about 6’2. She further stated that she did not saw the man’s face, however, because the robbers had instructed her not to look at them. The robbers also took money from another cashier.

While the holdup was in progress, the restaurant manager came downstairs from the second floor of the store and entered the area behind the register. From a distance of about six to nine feet, the manager was able to observe, for about five or ten seconds, the face of the man wearing the gray sweatshirt and holding the gun. The hood of his sweatshirt was drawn tightly around his head so that his hair and ears were not visible, and the shape of his head was obscured. But, the manager asserted that he saw their eyes, nose and mouth. At that distance, the manager, who testified that she was 5’6 or 5’7 tall, stated that she made eye contact with the robber with the gun. She later estimated his height at 5’7 or 5’8, and further described him as having a small goatee.