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A victim was seriously injured and his wife was killed as a result of a collision near Syracuse in August 1973. An eastbound vehicle operated by a driver, to whom an interim driver’s license had been issued two days earlier, crossed into the westbound lane and collided with the oncoming victim’s vehicle, as a consequence of the accident, the driver was convicted of driving while intoxicated (as a felony) and criminal negligent homicide.

A New York Criminal attorney said that it is claimed that the state is responsible for the injuries to the victim and the death of his wife because its agents and employees were negligent in establishing and operating the Onondaga County DWI Counter-Attack Program (Onondaga Program) in violation of the statutory authority for its creation, and were further negligent in issuing the interim driver’s license to the driver who, it is said, was not a proper candidate for such a license. The cases were tried in the Court of Claims on the issue of liability only, the parties having stipulated to reserve the issue of damages for later trial in the event liability was found. The trial court determined that the state’s agents and employees were negligent; that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries to the victim and the death of his wife; and that the claims were not proscribed by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

The Court reversed and dismissed the claims.

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A Monroe County Sheriff’s Deputy observed the criminal defendant’s vehicle changing lanes without signaling while traveling northbound on Route 15 in the Town of Brighton. The deputy pulled over and approached the defendant’s vehicle. From outside the defendant’s car the deputy noticed the defendant’s hands were trembling as he looked through his wallet for his driver’s license. The deputy smelled the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on the defendant’s breath. The deputy observed the criminal defendant swaying slightly as he exited his vehicle. He also noticed the defendant’s face was flushed and he once again observed the odor of an alcoholic beverage. The deputy testified that the defendant was polite and courteous.

The Deputy then radioed for the Sheriff Department’s mobile DWI processing van which arrived within 20 minutes. The van operator observed that although the criminal defendant’s face was pale, his cheeks were flushed and he swayed when he walked. The van operator then tested the defendant’s breath on a CMI Intoxilyzer 4011AS instrument. At this point in the trial defense counsel objected to the introduction into evidence of the test result on the grounds that the People must present expert testimony to establish the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 4011AS.

The court allowed the prosecution to offer proof of the test results but reserved on the objection made by defense counsel. The People presented a very thorough memorandum citing several reasons why expert testimony is not necessary at the time of trial on the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 4011AS. The first ten pages of the memorandum set forth the background and development of the Intoxilyzer 4011AS. In addition, Federal and New York State legislative and administrative recognitions of the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 4011AS were set forth. However, the Court must only consider New York State statutory and administrative authority.

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The matters before the Criminal Court on the defendants’ motions to dismiss the charges against them of criminal solicitation in the fifth degree on the ground that there exists some jurisdictional or legal impediment to the defendants’ conviction and on the ground that the accusatory instruments are defective. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motions to dismiss the charges of criminal solicitation in the fifth degree.

A New York Criminal attorney said that all of the defendants were arrested on various streets in the Northeastern section of the City of Rochester allegedly attempting to buy small amounts of marijuana. Those streets, among them Hudson and Conkey Avenues and Berlin Street, have become known as open-air drug markets where marijuana, and in some areas cocaine and heroin, can be purchased on the streets. Those who live and work in those areas have become frustrated at the misuse of their neighborhoods for drug activity, that activity bringing with it increased public safety concerns for themselves and their families.

The potential for violence in connection with the open-air drug trafficking was illustrated and underscored in January 1995 with the murder of an individual, a resident of the surrounding suburb of Penfield, New York, was shot to death while reportedly attempting to purchase marijuana in one of these open-air drug markets on Berlin Street.

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Defendant moves to suppress statements that he gave to the police, physical evidence recovered from his apartment, as well as identification testimony of a witness who identified him from a photo array. Defendant R. moves to suppress statements.

A New York Criminal lawyer said that at a suppression hearing pursuant to defendants’ applications to suppress evidence. Six witnesses, all current or retired members of the New York City Police Department, testified on behalf of the People. The defendants called no witnesses. Defendants urge to reject certain material portions of the testimony as incredible and untruthful. They particularly, but not exclusively, focus on the testimony of a Detective, and the contradictions between the testimony in general and the information contained in the paperwork prepared by the police during the investigation. The detective repeatedly contradicted himself on significant points and was forced to retract earlier statements on several occasions. There were instances in which his contradictions were brought to his attention and he was at a loss to satisfactorily explain them. Several of his explanations for his and his fellow detectives’ actions fly in the face of common sense.

A New York Criminal attorney said that the detective was the lead detective in a police team that was investigating of the deaths of 2 individuals. Their bodies had been discovered in the bathroom of an apartment, which was located at West Street. Both men had been bound with duct tape and shot through the head. When the detective and his team went to the apartment in April 2004 they smelled a strong odor of marijuana and observed marijuana residue. The police later discovered that Ashton had been a low-level drug dealer.

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A man is charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. It is alleged that the man was seated in the driver’s seat of a car and that a bag of crack cocaine, which had an aggregate weight in excess of one eighth of an ounce, along with a small amount of marijuana, were inside the car. Another individual in the car was indicted as the man’s accomplice.

About a month later, the man and three other individuals were arrested and charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near a school grounds. In is alleged that the man have handed a bag of heroin to an undercover police officer in exchange for money. It is also alleged that several accomplices directed the undercover officer to the man, one told the officer to try the car to see if the man was there.

Several months after being arraigned, the man applied for judicial diversion. The man was first screened for possible consideration by an addiction and substance abuse counselor. The man told the counselor that he has a 20 year history of weekend binges of alcohol consumption, and has been an intermittent user of cocaine. The counselor recommended that the man be evaluated for potential placement in drug and/or alcohol treatment.

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In this Criminal case, the question presented is whether a positive toxicology for marijuana and a respondent mother’s admission to prior marijuana use are sufficient to establish neglect pursuant to Family Ct Act § 1012 (f) (i) (B) or § 1046 (a) (iii). The Administration for Children’s Services (hereinafter, “ACS”) contends that they are. ACS asserts that the mother’s repeated use of marijuana establishes a prima facie case of parental culpability and that a prima facie case is not rebutted by a showing that the children were never harmed or in danger of harm and were always healthy, well kept, clean and well fed. According to ACS, dismissal of the petition based on its failure to present any specific evidence of actual impairment or imminent danger of such impairment would constitute error as a matter of law.

A New York Criminal lawyer said that Respondent mother contends that a newborn’s positive toxicology for marijuana alone is insufficient to support a finding of neglect because the test result, in and of itself, does not prove that the child was physically, mentally or emotionally impaired, or in imminent danger of being impaired. She contends that relying solely on a positive toxicology for a neglect determination fails to make the necessary causative connection to all the surrounding circumstances that may or may not produce impairment or imminent risk of impairment in the newborn child.

Additionally, respondent mother asserts that the record is insufficient to establish a prima facie case since no evidence was elicited establishing the quantity, frequency or effect of marijuana use upon her or her ability to care for her children. She emphasizes that she never used or was under the influence and criminal marijuana possession or any other drug while in the presence of any of her children. She underscores that the older children were in the care of the maternal grandmother during these occasions.

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The judgment of the Supreme Court convicting the defendant, after jury trial, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree and seventh degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 2 1/2 to 5 years and 1 year, respectively is affirmed.

The defendant relies on the decision which concluded that the knowingly requirement of Penal Law, setting forth the elements of criminal drug possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, applies also to the weight of the controlled substance, and that the trial evidence was insufficient to satisfy that mental culpability element. The defendant’s challenge here to the sufficiency of proof as to his knowledge of the weight of the controlled substance, however, was not preserved; he failed to object to the charge as given to the jury, and the court’s consideration of his claim is foreclosed as a matter of law.

Moreover, even if the issue had been preserved, it has not been shown that the trial evidence here was insufficient to satisfy the mental culpability element. In examining the record for legal sufficiency, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the People to determine whether there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant had thirteen vials of crack containing, in all, 1099 milligrams of cocaine, more than twice the 500 milligram element of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree set forth in Penal Law. It is not that he would be expected to know the weight of the cocaine by hefting the vials in his hand but that a rational jury might conclude that a person observed making hand-to-hand contacts with several passers-by in the street and in possession of thirteen vials containing 1099 milligrams of cocaine when the police thereafter approached him, would know the nature and weight of the essential element in the product he was carrying. The Court of Appeals recognized that often there will be evidence from which the requisite knowledge may be deduced. However, the Court was dealing with a conviction for attempted possession of psilocybin, a hallucinogen, in a package of mushrooms, and noted that the same inference may be unavailable for such controlled substances measured by pure weight for purposes of the statutory definitions of the crime but customarily combined with other substances to facilitate handling and use. Penal Law, for violation of which the defendant here was convicted, is similarly in terms of pure weight, but of cocaine, a much more common drug in our society and one commonly sold in the form of crack in vials. Here the test being described whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial from which it could be inferred that the defendant had the requisite knowledge of weight would have been met if the question had been preserved. No marijuana was found.

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This is an appeal where defendant was convicted defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of six years to life, unanimously affirmed.

A New York Criminal lawyer said that in March 2001, New York Police Department Sergeant was supervising a group of detectives in an undercover narcotics operation, and, along with a Detective was parked in an unmarked van on Riverside Drive, when a white Mazda with New Jersey license plates parked in front of them, next to a fire hydrant. The officers watched as defendant exited the Mazda’s passenger side, and a man exited the driver’s side. The two men walked north to a stairway which led to an underpass beneath Riverside Drive.

Approximately 15 minutes later, defendant and the mane returned to the Mazda, and looked around them before getting into the car and driving away. The Mazda drove north on Riverside Drive, then made a U-turn between 138th and 139th Streets, crossing over double yellow lines and pavement “zebra striping,” which designated that crossing and turning were not permitted.

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A Queens Gun Crime Lawyer said that, defendant was indicted for the crime of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree. He has moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the prosecutor failed to instruct the grand jury that if defendant possessed the weapon in his home or place of business, the gun crime would be only that of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, a class A misdemeanor.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, defendant is one of five incorporators and a director and manager of a not-for-profit corporation formed to sponsor domino games and hold domino competitions on the lower east side of Manhattan. He was arrested, while inside his club, in possession of a loaded pistol. He claims that his position as manager and director of the corporation entitles him to invoke the “place of business” exception provided in Penal Law § 265.02(4) as follows: “A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when (4) He possesses any loaded firearm. Such possession shall not, except as provided in subdivision one constitutes a violation of this section if such possession takes place in such person’s home or place of business.” The question of whether a not-for-profit corporation can be considered a “business” and whether it is the business of the manager or director so as to diminish his criminal liability are issues of first impression, certainly in New York and perhaps, nationwide.

The issue in this case is whether a social club a type of business exempted under the statute.

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Defendant was indicted for driving while intoxicated (DWI) as a felony and for obstructing governmental administration in the second degree for acts committed. As the basis for elevating defendant’s driving while intoxicated charge to a felony, the People filed a special information charging that defendant had a 1999 conviction for driving with an unlawful alcohol concentration in the state of Georgia, which would have been a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2) had it occurred in New York.

A New York New York criminal attorney said that defendant moved to dismiss the indictment raising several arguments, including that the date of the Georgia conviction rendered it ineligible to serve as a predicate for elevating the charge to driving while intoxicated as a felony. County Court denied the motion, finding that the legislative intent behind Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(8) was to treat prior out-of-state convictions as if they were prior convictions for the same actions occurring in New York State. The same DWAI court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence against him and defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated as a felony in full satisfaction of the indictment.

The Appellate Division reversed, vacated the plea, dismissed the first count of the indictment for felony driving while intoxicated without prejudice to the People to represent appropriate charges, reinstated the second count of the indictment for obstructing governmental administration and remitted to County Court for further proceedings on that second count. The Court determined that, based on the language of the 2006 amendment to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(8) and its enabling language, convictions occurring prior to the effective date of the statute, including defendant’s 1999 Georgia conviction, could not be used to raise a driving while intoxicated (DWI) offense from a misdemeanor to a felony. The Court, however, upheld County Court’s suppression ruling. A Judge of this Court granted both parties leave to appeal.

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