Articles Posted in Sex Crimes

Effective 21 January 1996, the New York Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), section 3 of Chapter 192 of the Laws of 1995, Correction Law Art. 6-C, sections 168-et seq., modeled after New Jersey’s Megan’s Law, requires that convicted criminal sex offenders register with the appropriate law enforcement agencies. On the basis of an assessment of risk, information pertaining to this offender may be disseminated by the appropriate law enforcement agencies to the public. Under SORA, there must be a determination of: whether a defendant is indeed “a sex offender or a sexually violent predator”; and, “the level of notification”.” These determinations are to be strongly based on the recommendations made by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (the Board). The Board has promulgated a Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI), which is to be utilized by the courts, “to assess the risk of a repeat offense by such sex offender and the threat posed to the public safety.”

Under the RAI, a numerical value to various factors is assigned, resulting in a “total risk factor score.” Based on this score, the offender is further categorized into one of three levels of notification. Where the risk of repeat offense is low, a level one designation (0 to +70) is assigned, and this requires that the appropriate law enforcement agencies are notified pursuant to SORA. Where the risk of repeat offense is moderate, a level two designation (+75 to +105) is assigned, and the appropriate law enforcement agencies “may disseminate relevant information which may include approximate address based on sex crimes offender’s zip code, a photograph of the offender, background information including the offender’s crime of conviction, modus of operation, type of victim targeted and the description of special conditions imposed on the offender to any entity with vulnerable populations” and “any entity receiving information on a sex offender may disclose or further disseminate such information at their discretion.” Where the risk of repeat offense is high, a level three designation (+110 to +300) is assigned, and the sex offender is deemed a “sexually violent predator.” In addition to all the requirements of a level two assignment, a level three sex offender’s exact address may be disseminated, and all of the pertinent information regarding the offender will be made available to the public through a subdirectory.

The RAI is not the sole criterion in determining: whether a defendant is a sex offender or a sexually violent predator”; and “the level of notification.” The sentencing court must also base its determinations on the victim’s statement and any materials submitted by the sex offender. Moreover, the sex offender must be allowed to appear and be heard. As clearly stated in the Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary of SORA, the risk factor calculated under the RAI is merely presumptive. If ‘special circumstances’ warrant a departure, the Court may depart from it. This ability to depart is based on the recognition that an objective instrument, no matter how well designed, will not fully capture the nuances of every case. Thus, a court is permitted to bring its sound judgment and expertise to bear on an otherwise coldly objective exercise which seeks to quantify that which may prove to be highly subjective. However, in People v. Ross, 1996, the court held that, “because the hearing was an ‘administrative function,’ it should ‘review the Board’s recommendations only for arbitrariness and capriciousness and otherwise uphold them.”

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In January 1992, respondent pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree robbery, and single counts of first-degree burglary, first-degree rape, and first-degree sodomy. This plea satisfied charges arising from two separate criminal incidents—the robbery of a gas station attendant and a home invasion—for which respondent was arrested and indicted separately in 1988. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 8 to 16 years, running from his arrest.

A New York Criminal attorney said that Respondent was released to parole supervision in July 1999, after serving 11 years and eight months of his sentence. But in May 2000, he was arrested and indicted separately for three robberies. Thereafter, he pleaded guilty to two counts of third-degree robbery, for each of which he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 2 to 4 years, and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, for which he was sentenced to prison for one year. The indictment satisfied by Respondent’s plea to the weapon-possession count also accused him of sexual abuse. These sentences ran concurrently to each other but consecutively to the undischarged portion of the indeterminate sentence imposed on Rashid in 1992. He was subsequently released to parole supervision thereafter.

Respondent was returned to prison for violating the conditions of his parole in July 2006. He was released to parole supervision again in April 2007, but went back to prison after violating the conditions of his parole in August of that year. He was next released to parole supervision in early 2008. He was arrested for the misdemeanor crimes of petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree. Upon pleading guilty to petit larceny,

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This case is a consolidation of eight juvenile delinquency proceedings for a dispositional hearing after a determination that each respondent has committed at least one act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime.

In each case, the court requested that the New York City Department of Probation conduct an investigation into the juvenile’s circumstances and that a written report be prepared for the dispositional hearing.

The court discovered that the New York City Department of Probation employs a computer-based program which contains an inherent bias which results in more favorable and less severe dispositional recommendations being made to the Family Court for female juvenile delinquents than for similarly situated male juvenile delinquents.

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This is a proceeding wherein the defendant, D.S.D. entered a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to CPL 220.15 to the crime of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, and to other related offenses.

It was alleged that on 23 January 2004, the criminal defendant displayed a firearm while threatening to use it against the complainant, the defendant’s sister-in-law, and that said actions caused her fear of physical injury.

A commitment order, pursuant to CPL 330.20[6], was issued and the defendant was remanded to the care and custody of the State Commissioner of Mental Health. The defendant was confined in a secure facility pursuant to CPL 330.20.

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On 23 October 2003, pursuant to the Sexual Offender Registration Act (SORA), the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (“the Board”) submitted a Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI) and recommended that defendant be designated as a Risk Level 2 Sexually Violent Offender upon his release from custody, based on his conviction for Attempted Sexual Abuse in the First Degree and on an assessed score of 95. Specifically, the Board assessed: 10 points for use of forcible compulsion; 25 points for sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or aggravated sexual abuse with the victim; 20 points for being either a stranger to the victim or having a relationship established for the purpose of victimizing or a professional relationship; 5 points for a criminal history with no sex crimes or felonies; 15 points for a history of drug or alcohol abuse; and, 20 points for unsatisfactory conduct while confined or supervised including sexual misconduct.

The Board compiled a Case Summary “based upon a review of the inmate’s file which includes but is not limited to the pre-sentence investigation, prior criminal history and post-offense behavior.” This summary stated, in pertinent part, that:

“While incarcerated, defendant completed a sex offender counseling program. His final evaluation indicates that he accepted responsibility for his actions and demonstrated remorse and empathy. Defendant, who admitted to abusing alcohol and to drinking on the night of the rape, did complete a substance abuse program. His disciplinary history contains a sex offense wherein during a visit with his wife and mother, defendant was observed with his hand “in between his wife’s legs, outside of clothing, rubbing her crotch vigorously.” “He also was placed in Protective Custody in May 2003 after being slashed on his face for gang activity, i.e., unauthorized organization activity.”

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On 3 May 2000, at approximately 11:00 p.m. within the vicinity of East 23rd Street and White Plains Road in Bronx County, S was with her friend R. There they saw defendant, MW, whom R knew. R talked to him while S was standing close by. S and R then got into the back seat of defendant’s car. JS, defendant’s friend, was also inside the car. When R got out to purchase some cigarettes or marijuana, defendant drove off leaving R behind. Defendant and JS detained S in a car and refused to let her leave when she requested to do so. At that time, S called to R for help. When she attempted to get out, JS pulled her back inside the car and covered her mouth when she tried to scream for help. Defendant then proceeded to drive to a parking lot. Thereafter, he got into the back seat, grabbed S’ thigh and demanded that she place his penis into her mouth. Afterwards, defendant removed S’ pants, held her hands down, and engaged in a sexual intercourse with her against her will. Defendant and JS held S down while defendant inserted his penis into her vagina. JS then inserted his penis into S’ mouth and masturbated into her mouth while defendant held her hands down as she was repeatedly shouting, “No.” JS then struck S in the mouth. After that, S was driven and forcibly thrown out of the car one block from her home.

On 4 May 2000, defendant MW and co-defendant JS were arrested for acting in concert in committing the crimes of Kidnaping in the First Degree (Penal Law § 135.25 [1]), Rape in the First Degree (Penal Law § 130.35 [1]), Sodomy in the First Degree (Penal Law § 130.50 [1]), and Unlawful Imprisonment in the First Degree (Penal Law § 135.10). At the time of his arrest, when told that he was being charged with rape, defendant responded, “I kind of had that feeling.”

Subsequently, criminal defendant was identified by S and an eyewitness in separate corporeal lineups. DNA tests performed on the victim and defendant revealed that his semen and that of another male were found on a vaginal swab of the victim as well as on her panties.

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This is an Article 78 proceeding filed by petitioner UJC against the respondents, the New York Police Department (NYPD) and its commissioner, to compel the production of records relating to raids on certain bondage, dominance, sadism and masochism (BDSM) establishments, pursuant to New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) (Public Officers Law, “POL” §§ 84-90), and for attorneys’ fees and costs.

The background facts are as follows:

Petitioner UJC is a New York not-for-profit legal and social services corporation. It has several divisions and one of which is the Sex Crimes Workers Project. This division is engaged in protecting the rights of people referred to as “sex workers,” people profiled as “sex workers” and victims of human trafficking.

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This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County rendered 5 May 2008 convicting him of rape in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of suppression of identification testimony.

The court reverses the judgment, on the law, vacates the plea, suppresses the identification testimony, and remits the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

The defendant agreed to plead guilty to sex crimes of rape in the first degree in exchange for a promised determinate sentence of nine years of imprisonment on the day after the Supreme Court denied suppression of identification testimony. During the course of the ensuing plea allocution, the Supreme Court advised the criminal defendant of the terms of its sentencing commitment, and briefly explained that he would be waiving his right to appeal.

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This is a proceeding wherein the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered 25 July 1980, convicting him of rape in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence and a judgment of the same court, rendered 12 December 1980, convicting him of endangering the welfare of a child, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence for sex crimes.

The court affirms the judgment.

The complainant left the home of her cousin on 1 January 1979 at approximately 9:15 P.M. While the complainant was walking on Rockaway Boulevard near 142 Street in Queens, she was approached by a man who asked her for directions. She stopped walking and looked at his face as she spoke to him. As she turned away and continued walking, the man put a gun to her neck and forced her to walk a few blocks and enter an abandoned house. Once inside, he led her down into the basement and then, still at gunpoint, into a second-floor bedroom. He ordered her to remove her clothes, put them back on and then remove them again. Eventually, he raped her. He refused to let her leave for about 10 more minutes while he simply stared at her. Finally, he ordered her to leave. The entire incident lasted about two hours.

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This is a proceeding wherein pursuant to an ex parte order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered 3 December 1971, the plaintiff, RMB, was appointed guardian ad litem for the infant ‘R’ and all similarly situated members of a class of unborn infants of less than 24 weeks’ gestation scheduled for abortion in public hospitals under the operation and control of the defendant New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation.

The purpose of the appointment was to commence this action for a judgment declaring that subdivision 3 of section 125.05 of the Penal Law is unconstitutional and for a permanent criminal injunction restraining the defendant Hospitals Corporation from performing abortional acts other than those necessary to preserve the life of the female.

By order to show cause dated 3 December 1971, the guardian moved for a preliminary injunction pending the trial of the action, restraining the above-mentioned Hospitals Corporation from proceeding with abortions other than those necessary to preserve the life of the female.

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