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Federal sentencing judges have broad discretion to consider a wide range of information when determining an appropriate sentence. That discretion, however, is not unlimited. A defendant may not be punished for the conduct of another person unless the law permits the conduct to be attributed to the defendant. Likewise, when a court considers uncharged conduct at sentencing, the allegations must be supported by sufficiently reliable evidence and proven by at least a preponderance of the evidence if disputed.

Background Facts

Chase Dralle pleaded guilty to illegally receiving a trafficked firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 933(a)(2) and 933(b). The advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment.

Federal terrorism prosecutions often involve multiple criminal charges arising from a single act. In such cases, courts must carefully examine whether the evidence supports each individual charge and whether the government proved every required element beyond a reasonable doubt. Even when the evidence clearly establishes that a defendant committed a serious terrorist attack, appellate courts must determine whether the convictions comply with federal law.

In United States v. Ullah, No. 21-1058 (2d Cir. 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the convictions of Akayed Ullah for his role in a bombing attack in a crowded underground pedestrian tunnel connecting the Times Square subway station and the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan. While the court upheld most of Ullah’s convictions and his life sentence, it concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support one of the terrorism-related charges.

Background Facts

People v Smith

In the case People v Gonzales (68 NY2d 424 [1986], the court outlined the conditioned required for a missing witness charge and burden shifting analysis. The court rules that the People failed to meet the criteria for that case.

The incident took place in May of 2013, when the victim was struck in the torso by a bullet. A stranger repeatedly shot at the victim and her boyfriend, JD. During the trial, the victim said that she and her JD were walking down the street in Rochester when JD called out to a car. The victim said the man in the car put on a jacket which was odd because it was a hot day. As they continued to walk, she noticed that the man with the jacket was following them. When the man got close, he pulled a gun and tried to push the victim to the ground. The victim didn’t fall to the ground and looked at the man. He smiled and shot her.

The complainant woman seeks damages for injuries she sustained as a result of her alleged wrongful arrest by court officers employed by the State Office of Court Administration. The trial of the claim was bifurcated and the decision addresses solely the issue of liability.

The complainant woman is an attorney formerly employed by the County District Attorney’s Office. She was assigned as a felony arraignment assistant in the criminal courts building in New York. Her testimony and that elicited from two court officers on the complainant’s direct case established that on that date, she was taken into custody by the two court officers in the Arraignment Part 1 courtroom (AR-1) and subsequently arrested and charged with petit larceny and possession of stolen property. She was transported to the 84th Precinct for processing and was later returned to the courthouse and arraigned on charges of criminal possession of stolen property, petit larceny and grand larceny. The charges were presented to a grand jury in Brooklyn and the grand jury returned no indictment.

The complainant testified that on the morning of July 2, 1999 she was assigned to handle arraignments in Arraignment Part 2 courtroom (AR-2). While she was on the record in AR-2, she was approached by a woman from the courtroom helpdesk. The woman’s duties encompassed arraignments in both Arraignment Parts 1 and 2, but she worked at a desk in the AR-1 courtroom. The complainant recalled that the courtroom helpdesk handed her a file and said it was a warrant or extradition or something and then left but when she later examined the papers, only an arrest file was included, not an extradition file as she expected. After unsuccessfully attempting to contact the courtroom helpdesk by telephone, the woman walked to the AR-1 courtroom purportedly to obtain the correct papers.

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This appeal’s case involves a murder and drug crime that had occurred in the Bronx and Manhattan respectively. On April 19, 2007, one male victim was shot to death while the other victim, also male, was shot in the buttocks and wounded outside an abandoned building. The defendant, also male, was charged for intentional second degree murder under Penal Law § 125.25[1], second degree assault under Penal Law § 120.05[2] and two counts of second degree weapon possession under Penal Law § 265.03[1][b]; [3]. The defendant appealed and requested that the inculpatory statements he had made be withdrawn because they had been obtained in the absence of a lawyer. The criminal defendant alleged that his right to counsel had been violated.

The arresting detective had been able to identify the defendant as a suspect due to evidence he had received from two witnesses. On May 17, 2007, the detective had learned that the defendant had been arrested for a drug crime in Manhattan. The detective drove to Manhattan and had the defendant remanded into his custody. Shortly after returning to the Bronx, Miranda warnings had been issued to the defendant, and then two separate lineups were conducted for the two eyewitnesses. The defendant had stated that he had no knowledge of the shootings, but both eyewitnesses had identified the defendant during the lineups. The defendant was then charged with homicide. Afterwards, the detective, along with another detective, escorted the defendant back to Manhattan for the arraignment on the drug crime. It is stated in the appellate opinion, that the first detective may have told the defendant that he had been identified by the two eyewitnesses. Robbery was not a part of the crime.

The first detective requested that the defendant be placed in his custody (release on his own recognizance) at the end of the hearing. The defendant met with his assigned attorney while sitting nearby the two detectives in the courtroom. According to the first detective’s testimony, the attorney had introduced himself as the defendant’s attorney on the drug case. He then provided his business card to the first detective and asked to speak to his client in private. The detectives then proceeded to move to other rows in the court house. The first detective testified that he had heard the attorney state to the defendant, after the hearing ended, that he would not be crossing the bridge to represent him, and that he would have another attorney representing him for the homicide case. The second detective verified this account during his testimony.

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A Nassau Sex Crime Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered April 1, 1996, convicting him of attempted rape in the first degree and sex abuse in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

The issue in this case is whether defendant is entitled to the suppression of his testimony.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the court finds that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s criminal guilt of attempted rape in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The complainant’s hearing testimony was generally logical and consistent and sufficed to establish the appellant’s commission of acts which constituted the elements of the crime of sex abuse in the second degree (see, Penal Law § 130.60[2]. With respect to the appellant’s challenge to the credibility of the complainant’s testimony, we note that the resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses. “Since this case was tried before a court without a jury, the greatest respect must be accorded the determination of the hearing court in assessing the credibility of [the witnesses] and resolving disputed questions of fact.

The Facts of the Case:

On 11 October 1988, the petitioner was charged in the circuit court with three traffic-related offenses. One of the charges was for DUI in violation of the Florida Statutes, to wit: that any person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent DUI violation is guilty of a felony of the third degree. However, the information filed charging the petitioner made no mention of any specific prior DUI convictions, nor did the state before trial provide the petitioner any details of the alleged prior convictions. At arraignment, petitioner moved to dismiss or to transfer the matter to the county court, contending that because the information did not inform him of what specific prior offenses he allegedly committed, the information did not adequately charge the felony, and therefore the circuit court had no jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the motion. Consequently, the jury found petitioner guilty of DUI. After denying the petitioner’s renewed motion to dismiss, the court immediately adjudicated petitioner guilty of third-degree felony DUI and sentenced him to four and one-half years’ imprisonment. Thereafter, the district court reversed on the ground that the felony prosecution in circuit court was improper because the information merely charged petitioner, in effect, with three misdemeanors. The district court expressed conflict with a prior court ruling which held that the state need not allege the prior DUI convictions in the charging document because of possible prejudice to the accused in the event the prior convictions were brought to the jury’s attention.

The Issue of the Case:

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The defendant is appealing his conviction for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana and possession (marijuana possession) with the intent to distribute Quaaludes. He is appealing his sentence as well. The defendant argues that the district court was wrong in the instructions that they gave to the jury, that more than one sentence for possessing more than one drug is not authorized, and that the sentenced that was imposed underneath one of the counts was in excess of what is allowed by the state.

Case Background

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the defendant was convicted on two counts of possession of a controlled substance. The first count convicted the defendant of possession with the intent to distribute marijuana. The second count convicted the defendant of possession with the intent to distribute Quaaludes.