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When a criminal case reaches an appellate court, the judges do not have unlimited authority to review every issue that appears in the record. Instead, their authority is defined by statute. One important question is whether an appellate court may affirm a trial court’s ruling based on a legal theory that the trial court rejected or never adopted.

The New York Court of Appeals addressed that issue in People v. LaFontaine, 92 N.Y.2d 470 (1998). The case arose from a motion to suppress evidence seized after an arrest made by out-of-state police officers in New York. Although the lower courts disagreed about why the arrest was lawful, the Court of Appeals focused on a different question: whether the Appellate Division had the authority to affirm the denial of suppression on a ground that the trial court had rejected. The Court’s decision became a leading New York criminal procedure case concerning the scope of appellate review in criminal appeals.

Background Facts

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New York criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. However, not every mistake made by a defense attorney amounts to ineffective assistance. Courts have long recognized that criminal defense attorneys must make strategic decisions throughout a case, and some of those decisions may not succeed. The question is not whether an attorney provided perfect representation, but whether the defendant received a fair trial and meaningful legal representation.

In People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708 (1998), the New York Court of Appeals addressed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising from a robbery conviction. The case gave the Court an opportunity to explain New York’s standard for evaluating claims that a criminal defense attorney provided ineffective representation. The decision remains one of the most frequently cited New York cases on the subject and continues to guide courts evaluating whether a defendant received meaningful representation.

Background Facts

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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. For many years, federal courts applied a rule that prevented prosecutors from using evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches. However, states were not required to follow the same rule. That changed in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

Background Facts

The case began on May 23, 1957, when police officers arrived at the Cleveland, Ohio home of Dollree Mapp. Officers were investigating information that a person wanted for questioning in connection with a bombing might be hiding in the residence. They also suspected that gambling materials might be located inside the home. When officers first arrived, Mapp refused to allow them to enter without a search warrant. She contacted her attorney and followed his advice not to admit the officers unless they produced a warrant.

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The right to remain silent is one of the most well-known protections in the American criminal justice system. Under Miranda v. Arizona, police generally must advise suspects of certain constitutional rights before conducting a custodial interrogation. Those rights include the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present during questioning.

In Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), the United States Supreme Court considered whether a suspect exercised his right to remain silent by remaining largely silent during a police interrogation. The case arose after Van Chester Thompkins challenged the admission of statements he made to police during questioning about a fatal shooting. After lower courts reached different conclusions about the effect of his silence during the interrogation, the dispute ultimately reached the Supreme Court.

Background Facts

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In People v. Guerrero, the New York Court of Appeals reviewed how courts apply the “extraordinary circumstances” standard under the Raise the Age law. The case involved a defendant who was under 18 at the time of the alleged conduct and therefore eligible for transfer from the youth part of a criminal court to Family Court. Cases in the youth part are handled within the criminal court system and can result in criminal convictions and prison sentences. In contrast, Family Court focuses on supervision and services, and does not result in a criminal conviction. The statute creates a presumption that such cases should be handled in Family Court unless certain findings are made. The question before the Court was whether the youth part properly exercised its discretion in deciding that the case should remain in criminal court rather than be transferred. The Court examined the statutory framework, the defendant’s history, and the facts presented at the hearing on the motion to prevent removal.

Background Facts

The defendant was charged in connection with a home invasion that took place in February 2021. According to the prosecution, the defendant and several accomplices planned to enter a residence and commit a robbery. Each participant carried a weapon, including knives, and one accomplice had a handgun. During the incident, the group entered the home, restrained the victim, and threatened harm. One accomplice struck the victim with a shotgun multiple times, causing injury.

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In People v. Dondorfer, the New York Court of Appeals addressed how courts should define the term “impaired” in cases involving driving after the use of alcohol, drugs, or both. The case focused on whether the same definition of impairment applied across different sections of the Vehicle and Traffic Law or whether a different standard should apply when drugs were involved. The issue arose in the context of a grand jury instruction and a pretrial dismissal of a charge. The Court reviewed the statutory language, prior case law, and principles of statutory interpretation to determine how the term should be applied.

Background Facts

The case arose after a traffic stop involving Phillip Dondorfer, who was driving a vehicle with his fifteen-year-old daughter as a passenger. During the stop, Dondorfer admitted that he had consumed alcohol and had also used marijuana. Law enforcement officers conducted field sobriety tests, which Dondorfer failed. A police officer trained as a drug recognition expert conducted an evaluation and concluded that Dondorfer was impaired by a combination of alcohol and cannabis and was unable to operate a vehicle safely.

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In People v Williams, the New York Court of Appeals examined how New York’s speedy trial statute applies when the prosecution files a statement of readiness along with a certification that all counts in an accusatory instrument are facially sufficient. Under Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 (5-a), the prosecution must certify that each count meets statutory pleading requirements and that any defective counts have been dismissed before declaring readiness for trial. The case raised a question about what happens when that certification is later shown to be inaccurate.

The appeal required the Court to interpret the statutory language of CPL 30.30 (5-a), consider how that provision interacts with other parts of the Criminal Procedure Law, and determine whether an error in certification affects the validity of the prosecution’s readiness for trial. The case also addressed the appropriate remedy when one count in an accusatory instrument does not meet the legal standard for facial sufficiency.

This decision is important for criminal practice because it addresses how courts should treat statements of readiness and how defects in charging documents affect a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

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A criminal defendant has the right to a verdict reached by jurors who can decide the case without bias. When a court receives information that a juror may have acted with racial bias during deliberations, the court must respond with care. The judge must protect the defendant’s right to an impartial jury while also avoiding needless intrusion into the jury room. In People v. Wiggins, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court should have declared a mistrial after one juror reported that other jurors had made comments reflecting racial bias during deliberations. The case required the Court to examine the trial judge’s inquiry, the responses given by the jurors who were questioned, and whether the denial of a mistrial fell within the court’s discretion.

Background Facts

The charges arose from two shootings in Buffalo during the early morning of August 4, 2016. The first shooting happened near Maple Street around 1:00 a.m. and left one person wounded. About one hour later, a second shooting happened near Sherman Street and left one person dead and two others injured. The defendant was charged in one indictment with crimes arising from both incidents.

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A guilty plea in New York is valid only if it is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. This means the defendant must understand the charges, the rights being given up, and the direct consequences of the plea, including the sentence that may be imposed. The decision to plead guilty must be made freely, without improper pressure, and based on accurate information. When a court gives incorrect information about sentencing, that error can affect whether the plea meets this standard.

In People v. Scott, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether a guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent when the trial court repeatedly gave the defendant the wrong information about the sentence he could face if he went to trial and lost. The case involved three burglary charges arising from separate incidents, a negotiated plea offer, and later statements by the court about possible consecutive sentences. The appeal required the Court to examine the effect of sentencing misinformation on a defendant’s decision to plead guilty and to decide whether the issue could be reviewed on direct appeal even though the defendant had not moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing.

Background Facts

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In People v. Moss, the New York Court of Appeals considered how a prior sex crime conviction affected classification under the Sex Offender Registration Act, often called SORA. The case focused on one of the Guidelines overrides that can automatically raise a person’s presumptive risk level. The issue was whether that override applied when the defendant claimed that an earlier felony sex crime conviction was unconstitutional, even though that conviction had never been vacated or reversed. The Court examined the text of the Guidelines, the available procedures for challenging a conviction, and the limited effect of a prior resentencing ruling in one of defendant’s criminal cases.

Background Facts

The defendant had a long record of sex offense convictions. In 1995, he pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct for raping a 13-year-old child when he was 25 years old. In 2006, he pleaded guilty to course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree for repeated sexual abuse of a child from 2004 through January 2006, when the child was between 10 and 12 years old. During that time, the victim became pregnant, and the defendant arranged for an abortion. In 2007, he pleaded guilty to forcible touching for touching a 15-year-old girl while masturbating. In 2016, he was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child after incidents involving a seven-year-old relative whom he was babysitting.

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