New York Criminal Lawyer Blog

Published on: May 19, 2014

General Municipal Law § 50-e(1)(a

by Stephen Bilkis

A Nassau Rape Lawyer, on this appeal we are called upon to consider the effect and interplay of CPL 160.50 (sealing of records upon termination of criminal action in favor of the accused) and General Municipal Law § 50-e (notice of claim). Since the Supreme Court did not give proper consideration to the impact of CPL 160.50 in this case, we have modified the order by imposing certain conditions. On the evening of August 2, 1991, the petitioner, was arrested by a member of the New York City Housing Authority Police Department, in front of 453 Beach 40th Street in Queens. Ragland was arrested for criminal contempt in the second degree (violation of an order of protection) and harassment. The officer acted on the basis of information supplied to him by the person who was to be protected by the order of protection.

A Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, the petitioner was arraigned in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County, and remanded, apparently in default of bail, until August 13, 1991. The charges were dismissed on November 7, 1991, and all records sealed pursuant to CPL 160.50. While the certificate of disposition does not set forth the reason for the dismissal, the petitioner indicates that it was because he had never been served with the order of protection. The petitioner, acting pro se, served a notice of claim upon the City of New York in January 1992. Subsequently, according to the petitioner, the Comptroller’s Office advised him that the City was not the proper party to be given notice. In March 1992 the petitioner consulted with his attorney and promptly moved for permission to serve a late notice of claim against the New York City Housing Authority (hereinafter the Authority), alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution resulting in “mental anguish or suffering, shame and humiliation, ridicule and scorn, moral and mental degradation, loss of earnings, property loss and physical injury”. Public Housing Law § 157(2) provides that all notices of claim relating to personal injuries must be presented to the Authority within 90 days and that all of the provisions of General Municipal Law § 50-e shall apply to such notices.

The Supreme Court granted the application, and deemed the notice of claim to be timely served. This decision was predicated upon the finding that the Authority had actual knowledge of the facts constituting the petitioner’s cause of action. The court did not address the question of any possible prejudice to the Authority.

Published on: May 18, 2014

People v. Blajeski

by Stephen Bilkis

People v. Blajeski

Court Discusses Whether there was Probable Cause to Suspect the Defendant for Driving While Intoxicated DWI

The defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated after parking in a drug prone area. The defendant was found drug prone area with in a vehicle with two other males while the engine was running at a curb. The police observed that the defendant had blood shot eyes, slurred speech and his breath smelled of alcohol after he was questioned by the police. The defendant was also found in possession of cocaine and diazepam, a prescription drug after being searched. The Supreme Court suppressed the findings of the search due to lack of probable cause to suspect that he was participating in criminal activity. The People appealed the decision.

Published on: May 17, 2014

Appellate Division of this Department

by Stephen Bilkis

A Suffolk Criminal Lawyer said that, at about 6:50 P.M. on January 19, 1981, Detective of the Suffolk County Police Department Homicide Squad went to premises commonly known and referred to as 8 Nina Place in Farmingville where the homicide giving rise to the prosecution of this action occurred. Upon arriving he was informed by Patrolman of this department that a certain individual had called the precinct the previous evening and reported that he had been threatened by a person known to him as “Billy the Kid,” while the said individual had been at the above-mentioned premises. The patrolman stated that the only person he knew by that name was defendant who lived at 5 Roslyn Avenue in Selden.

A Suffolk Grand Larceny Lawyer said that, the following day, the detective called “Central Records” and was told that defendant had been arrested several times, the last having occurred on January 6, 1981, for a burglary. Defendant’s arrest records, Exhibits D and E, show a number of arrests–approximately eleven–from December 19, 1979, to December 8, 1980, all with the notation “no disposition,” but do not mention the January 6 arrest. Continuing with his investigation, the detective spoke to the other Detectives of the Fourth Squad Detectives who advised him that all of defendant’s “troubles” stemmed from difficulties he was having as the result of his relationship with a married woman, who lived in a neighboring community and that his last arrest, the one on January 6, came about when either she or her husband charged defendant with assault, trespass, burglary, and harassment.

A Suffolk Robbery Lawyer said that, sometime during January 21, a call was received by a Patrolman of the Fourth Squad Detectives from defendant’s mother seeking help for him. Defendant had, at this point, been taken to Brookhaven Memorial Hospital along with the married woman after an automobile accident which occurred while they were enroute to a motel. It should be noted that defendant had become the patrolman’s informant after the latter had arrested defendant on December 8, 1980, as the result of a burglary complaint made by the girlfriend’s husband. After this earlier arrest, defendant had been advised by the patrolman to get a lawyer, but defendant insisted it was “all bullshit going to Family Court.”

Published on: May 17, 2014

On November 2009, the man was sentenced as a second drug felony offender

by Stephen Bilkis

This proceeding was originated from the appeal of a man. The man, who is an inmate at one correctional facility, is challenging the computation of his jail time credit associated with his current sentence of imprisonment. The court then issued an order to show cause, and has received and reviewed the answer of the commissioner and the chief officer.

The court received and reviewed the affirmation submitted on behalf of the department of correction. The court also received and reviewed the man’s reply to the answering papers.

On 2006, the man was sentenced to a determinate term of two years, with two years’ post-release supervision, upon his conviction of the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. He was then received into the custody as entitled to one hundred eleven days of jail time credit. Running the two year determinate term from that date, less one hundred eleven days of jail time credit, the officials determined the initial maximum expiration date of the man’s 2006 sentence to be on 2008.

Published on: May 16, 2014

“Rules of the Road”

by Stephen Bilkis

The line which marks the boundary between permissible police action and an unwarranted intrusion in violation of Fourth Amendment rights is frequently thin and not readily distinguishable. The need for on-the-spot decisions by law enforcement officials does not afford them the luxury of a contemporaneous in-depth analysis or consultation with counsel. It is reserved to the courts to make a retrospective judgment and to consider the multitude of variables in weighing the interests of society vis-a-vis the inherent rights of a citizen. Such an issue is presented on defendant’s motion to suppress physical property which forms the basis for charges of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree, two counts of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Eighth Degree and Criminal Possession of Marijuana in the Fourth Degree. Defendant also moves to suppress “as fruits of the poisonous tree” post arrest statements attributed to him.

A Suffolk Marijuana Possession Lawyer said that, at about 10:30 p. m. on the night of December 1, 1978, two police officers on routine patrol in the parking lot of a shopping center in Bay Shore observed the defendant walking erratically toward a car. Their interest was heightened by the fact that he was singing loudly and waving a walking stick. The defendant is a 250 pound male, aged 27, who on this winter night was wearing an earring, a suede hat with a wide brim, a vest, checkered shirt, blue jeans and carrying a large wooden eagle. The total impact of the defendant’s conduct and presumably his appearance, prompted the officers to intercept and stop him after he had entered the car, put it in motion, and started to back up.

A Suffolk Drug Possession Lawyer said that, upon request, the defendant exited his car and produced his license, registration, and insurance card. He was then asked whether he was intoxicated or sick. Defendant replied he was “only slightly high” and was on his way to Lala’s Bar on Sunrise Highway and was well enough to drive his vehicle. The defendant was concededly not belligerent. One of the experienced police officers concluded from his observations including those as to the defendant’s eyes, speech described as “somewhat slurred” and the odor of his breath, that defendant was inebriated and arrested him for Driving While Intoxicated. The other police officer made no observations as to defendant’s eyes, his breath or speech before the arrest, but nonetheless concluded from defendant’s conduct that he was intoxicated. The defendant was not given any of the usual field tests such as touching his nose, picking up a coin, or walking a straight line.

Published on: May 16, 2014

The complainant left the home of her cousin on 1 January 1979

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a proceeding wherein the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered 25 July 1980, convicting him of rape in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence and a judgment of the same court, rendered 12 December 1980, convicting him of endangering the welfare of a child, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence for sex crimes.

The court affirms the judgment.

The complainant left the home of her cousin on 1 January 1979 at approximately 9:15 P.M. While the complainant was walking on Rockaway Boulevard near 142 Street in Queens, she was approached by a man who asked her for directions. She stopped walking and looked at his face as she spoke to him. As she turned away and continued walking, the man put a gun to her neck and forced her to walk a few blocks and enter an abandoned house. Once inside, he led her down into the basement and then, still at gunpoint, into a second-floor bedroom. He ordered her to remove her clothes, put them back on and then remove them again. Eventually, he raped her. He refused to let her leave for about 10 more minutes while he simply stared at her. Finally, he ordered her to leave. The entire incident lasted about two hours.

Published on: May 16, 2014

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a criminal action wherein defendants filed an appeal, challenging the judgments of conviction rendered against them, and the order denying their post judgment motion for vacatur.

A Queens County Criminal lawyer said that the defendants served as president and vice-president of the defendant corporation engaged in the business, among other things, of providing public transportation between Nassau and Suffolk Counties and Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports and Queens Plaza in Queens County. The defendants’ convictions of attempted grand larceny in the second degree and offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree were based upon their participation in a program providing carriers with subsidies from the State, through the county, based upon a formula taking into account the number of revenue-generating miles traveled and the number of revenue-paying passengers carried on “line regular trips between established locations pursuant to fixed, predetermined time schedules.

A Queens County Criminal attorney said that during the second quarter of 1982, operators were entitled to payment under the program at the rate of $0.135 per revenue passenger and $0.415 per revenue mile; after the amount of reimbursement was calculated, it was then discounted to 83 percent. According to the People, the defendants filed a quarterly report, as required, with the transportation division of the Suffolk County Planning Department for the quarter in question, which falsely overstated mileage and passenger counts on their airport line runs and Queens Plaza line runs with the intent to obtain funds in excess of the amount to which they were entitled. However, during the trial, the prosecutor specifically and unequivocally withdrew any claims by the People with respect to falsification of mileage counts, and undertook to prove the two counts in question solely on the basis of false passenger counts.

Published on: May 14, 2014

Trippe v Trippe, Matter of Thomas and Matter of Beyer

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a proceeding wherein pursuant to an ex parte order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered 3 December 1971, the plaintiff, RMB, was appointed guardian ad litem for the infant ‘R’ and all similarly situated members of a class of unborn infants of less than 24 weeks’ gestation scheduled for abortion in public hospitals under the operation and control of the defendant New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation.

The purpose of the appointment was to commence this action for a judgment declaring that subdivision 3 of section 125.05 of the Penal Law is unconstitutional and for a permanent criminal injunction restraining the defendant Hospitals Corporation from performing abortional acts other than those necessary to preserve the life of the female.

By order to show cause dated 3 December 1971, the guardian moved for a preliminary injunction pending the trial of the action, restraining the above-mentioned Hospitals Corporation from proceeding with abortions other than those necessary to preserve the life of the female.

Published on: May 14, 2014

People v. Niedzwiecki

by Stephen Bilkis

People v. Niedzwiecki

Court Discusses Whether a Polish Immigrant Received Clear and Unambiguous Refusal Warning

The defendant was a polish immigrant who was arrested by the police for DWI driving while intoxicated. The defendant was initially stopped by the police after he operated his vehicle without his headlights and was weaving while driving. The defendant was read his Miranda rights in English even though it was evident that he had a strong foreign accent. The defendant was asked to submit to a breathalyzer test and requested the assistance of a Polish “translocator”. The criminal defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer test and later requested to supress his refusal because the warning was not unequivocal in a language that he could understand.

Published on: May 13, 2014

Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

by Stephen Bilkis

In this Criminal case, the People appealed from an order, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Indictment, with leave to represent the matter to the Grand Jury on the ground that he was deprived of his right to appear before the Grand Jury pursuant to CPL 190.50.

A Queens County Criminal lawyer said that after an incident which occurred in Queens County in October 1995, the defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint. The felony complaint charged the defendant with robbery in the third degree and grand larceny in the fourth degree.

At his arraignment, the defendant was duly served with notice that the charges in the felony complaint would be presented to the Grand Jury. The defendant ultimately declined to testify before the Grand Jury. The defendant was subsequently charged in an indictment with robbery in the first degree and robbery in the third degree.