Long Beach City Court

October 24, 2014,

In this Criminal case, the defendant moves to dismiss the superior court information in this matter pursuant to section 210.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law on the ground that the information charges an offense other than the one for which he was held by the Long Beach City Court for action of the grand jury.

This matter was previously the subject of consideration by this Court in relation to a motion to amend the superior court information. In its decision on the former motion this Court expressed the view that under the provisions of the recent amendment to the New York State Constitution a person may only waive indictment and consent to be prosecuted by superior court information in relation to the charge in the local criminal court for which that person was held for grand jury action.

This precise issue, however, could not be decided on the previous motion and it required this motion to dismiss to place the question squarely before the Court.

It is undisputed that the defendant herein was charged in the local court with grand larceny in the third degree and that he was held for grand jury action in relation to that charge. The superior court information, however, does not charge that offense but, rather, charges grand larceny in the second degree, manifestly, a higher degree of the crime of larceny.

The District Attorney, in opposing this motion, does not dispute the validity of the court's position in its previous decison. court's position in its previous decision. terms of the legislative enactments which implemented the constitutional amendment the waiver of indictment and the superior court information 'may include any offense for which the defendant was held for action of a grand jury and any offense of offenses properly joinable therewith' pursuant to sections 200.20 and 200.40 of the Criminal Procedure Law.

As was previously pointed out by this Court on the former motion, serious doubt exists concerning the validity of the statutes permitting the inclusion of joinable offenses in view of the narrow scope of the constitutional provision pertaining to waiver of indictment.

Indeed, in view of the plain and precise language of the constitutional amendment it may even be argued that the implementing statutes, at least in relation to the waiver of an indictment, may have been unnecessary since the constitutional provisions would appear to be self-executing.

To Be Cont...

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Support of Assembly Bill 10473-A

October 24, 2014,

Defendant, through his attorney, moves this Court pursuant to CPL § 440.20, for an order setting aside and modifying the sentence previously imposed upon him on the grounds that the sentence was unauthorized; was illegally imposed; and is invalid as a matter of law.
A Nassau County Criminal attorney said that on February 8, 1995, the Grand Jury of Nassau County indicted the defendant for several crimes of: Offering a False Instrument for Filing; Attempted Grand larceny; Grand larceny; and Defrauding the Government.

On December 10, 1996, the criminal defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, on each count of the indictment. Post verdict, the defendant moved this Court, pursuant to CPL § 330.30(1), for an order setting aside the verdict. The Court granted the defendant's motion with respect to Counts 3 and 4, and denied defendant's motion with respect to Counts 1 and 2.

Prior to sentencing, the Court held a pre-sentence conference with Assistant District Attorney and Attorneys for the defendant, wherein, inter alia, the issue of restitution was discussed. Specifically, the discussion focused on the costs incurred by the County of Nassau in its investigation of the defendant. According to the Probation Department's pre-sentence report, such investigative costs amounted to $17,572.30. During the discussion, the Court informed all counsel that, should the defendant voluntarily offer to recompense the County for its investigative costs, the Court would seriously evaluate and consider such a proposal in determining an appropriate sentence.

On March 7, 1997, as the Court imposed sentence, it asked the defendant whether he voluntarily made the offer proposed by defense counsel and that he consented to it. After a short colloquy, the defendant indicated his consent to repay Nassau County for its investigative costs. The Court then sentenced the defendant to term of probation of five years with additional conditions of (1) payment of a $5,000.00 fine and (2) payment of $17,572.30, reimbursement to Nassau County for investigative costs, plus a 5% surcharge for a total of $18,450.92, at a rate of $350.00 per month beginning April 6, 1997 and continuing over the probationary period.

To Be Cont...

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The court ultimately sentenced the defendant

October 23, 2014,

In this Criminal action, the defendant here pleaded guilty only after the court told him that, if he did not, he would be remanded until his next scheduled court appearance. The issue presented on this appeal is whether the plea was voluntary.

A Nassau County Criminal lawyer said that in November 2005, the People filed a felony complaint charging the defendant with two counts of falsifying business records in the first degree. He was arraigned on the complaint and released on $1,000 bail. Seven months later, a grand jury returned a 40-count indictment charging the defendant with two counts of grand larceny in the third degree, scheme to defraud in the first degree, granc larceny in the fourth degree, petit larceny, attempted granc larceny in the fourth degree, attempted petit larceny, twenty-four counts of falsifying business records in the first degree, seven counts of insurance fraud in the fourth degree, and two counts of insurance fraud in the fifth degree.

The charges were based on allegations that, between December 21, 1999 and October 13, 2005, the defendant, a licensed dentist with a practice in Hempstead, New York, repeatedly submitted falsified claim forms to a number of insurance carriers and attempted to alter his own business records to avoid detection.

At the defendant's arraignment on the indictment on July 6, 2006, the People asked that bail be fixed at $250,000. The court, however, continued the $1,000 bail previously set, but directed a "conditional release" which involved placing the defendant under the supervision of the Nassau County Probation Department." The court further directed that the defendant surrender his passport and report to the Nassau County Investigation Bureau for processing.
When the case was called on November 21, 2006, the court observed that it was "ripe for trial." On December 18, 2006, the court stated that the case was "getting old meaning it's going to be either disposed of soon or it's going to be tried soon." The court then told the defendant that it had reviewed the minutes of the grand jury proceedings and had concluded that, in view of the "overwhelming" proof presented, his chances of prevailing at trial were slim. The court said it would adjourn the case for the defendant to decide whether or not to accept the plea offer, and that, if he did not, the case would be "farmed out for trial."

For reasons not clear from the record, the matter was subsequently adjourned a number of times until all parties again appeared in court on Wednesday, January 3, 2007. Plea discussions continued, and the court revealed that it had received a letter from the Probation Department complaining of the defendant's failure to comply fully with the conditions of his release. The Probation Department asked that the court "admonish the defendant and remind him that he must report as directed if he wishes to remain at liberty."

The terms of the plea were then spread on the record. The defendant would plead guilty to two counts of granc larceny in the third degree, scheme to defraud in the first degree, granc larceny in the fourth degree, and falsifying business records in the first degree; he would waive his right to appeal, pay restitution in the amount of $10,102.20, and surrender his license to practice dentistry. At the time of sentence, the People would dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment, and would recommend that the defendant be fined $20,000 and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 1 1/3 to 4 years. The court would then sentence the defendant to probation with restitution and the suspension of his dentistry license, unless it felt, based upon the presentence report, that it could not fulfill its promise of a nonjail sentence. In that event, the defendant would be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty.

To Be Cont...

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Executive Law § 63(3)...cont

October 23, 2014,


In another criminal case, defendant appealed from six judgments of the County Court, Nassau County, all rendered May 16, 1984, convicting him of grand larceny, petit larceny, commercial bribing in the first degree and scheme to defraud in the first degree, upon jury verdicts, and convicting him of attempted grand larceny.

On appeal, defendant contends that the Attorney-General was not properly authorized to conduct Grand Jury proceedings in accordance with Executive Law § 63(3), and that the additional Grand Jury which returned the indictments against him was not impaneled in accordance with the rules of this court.

Executive Law § 63(3) provides, inter alia, that the Attorney-General shall investigate and prosecute "the alleged commission of any indictable offense or offenses in violation of the law in relation to any matters connected with [the Insurance] department" upon "request" of the Superintendent of Insurance. Initially, we note that this provision "should not be construed strictly, but, rather, should be read in 'a sense to accomplish the purpose intended' "

In the absence of any mandated form in the Executive Law for such requests, we find sufficient authorization in the Insurance Law for the form used. Insurance Law § 302 provides that any order of the Superintendent which must be in writing may be "signed by the superintendent or by his authority".

Turning to defendant's second contention, we find that the order of the County Court Judge which authorized the impaneling of an Attorney-General's Grand Jury was not in contravention of any statute.

Defendant also contends that every theory or definition of larceny outlined in Penal Law § 155.05 which was charged to the jury must be sustained by the evidence in order to support his conviction for grand larceny in the second degree. He contends that one of the four theories so charged was not established by the evidence. He urges that a criminal conviction must be reversed where the jury may have determined guilt based upon a theory not supported by the evidence. We do not reach this issue of law because we find that each of the four theories of larceny upon which the jury was instructed was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence concerning second degree grand larceny by bad check. The crime of issuing a bad check is defined in relevant part as follows: “A person is guilty of issuing a bad check when: "1. (a) As a drawer or representative drawer, he utters a check knowing that he or his principal, as the case may be, does not then have sufficient funds with the drawee to cover it, and he intends or believes at the time of utterance that payment will be refused by the drawee upon presentation, and payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation"

Defendant contends that the People failed to prove that he uttered the checks at issue knowing that he did not then have sufficient funds with the drawee. The People offered no direct evidence concerning defendant's bank balances at the time of utterance.

A representative of the New York State Automobile Insurance Plan testified that in January 1981 the plan's certified check requirement was reimposed upon defendant's multiple brokerage corporations due to the number of checks returned unpaid by the drawee banks.
In addition, representatives of the three insurance carriers named in the indictment as victims of defendant's larceny testified to amounts unrecovered by reason of defendant's dishonored checks. A collection clerk with the Allstate Insurance Company, testified that defendant's checks in the amount of $5,000 were returned unpaid for "insufficient funds" or "account closed". Photocopies of the dishonored checks were introduced into evidence.

In addition, defendant's employees testified that he was kept informed of daily bank balances, that checks were issued upon insufficient funds, and that defendant's authorization was required to issue checks.

Nassau County Police Form 38 ...cont

October 22, 2014,


Thus, there is simply no other conclusion but that defendant was using funds invested by subsequent investors to meet his prior obligations. Investors who wished to withdraw funds from the plan were paid from funds supplied by incoming investors. Hence, defendant's ability to fulfill his promises was premised solely on the illegal continuation and expansion of receiving increased investment funds, which continuation was in jeopardy from the inception. The finding that defendant was conducting a fraudulent scheme rather than a legitimate investment program is further bolstered by his boast to associate that if his conduct became known, the Ponzi scheme would thereafter be known as the scheme.

Further evidence of defendant's fraudulent intent may be inferred from his actions after the arrest of one of his Nassau County agents. When the scheme began to fall apart, defendant fled to New Jersey, stating that he did not want to be bothered by the District Attorney. He destroyed his records relating to the plan and instructed his agents to do likewise. Defendant hoped that by raising the funds necessary to pay back investors he would be able to stave off any larceny charges.

And, of course, defendant's voluntary statements after his arrest in Sweden destroy any claim that he was merely an overly optimistic investment advisor whose fortunes plunged due to an unexpected downturn in the market.

It is true that defendant's operations assumed some of the forms of a legitimate business venture. Nevertheless, beneath it all the manner in which he obtained possession of the money of his victims was by means of false promise. No other conclusion can be drawn from the record but that defendant plainly intended from the inception, and at every stage of his operation, to obtain the money of others by means of fraudulent devices and then appropriate that money to his own use. In sum, the evidence in these cases is wholly consistent with guilty intent and excludes to a moral certainty every hypothesis except that the criminal defendant intended to perform.

As an additional ground for reversal, defendant maintains that principles of both statutory and constitutional double jeopardy precluded his trial in Nassau County in connection with drug charges arising out of the same plan which was the predicate for his prior Suffolk County convictions. The flaw in these arguments lies in the fact that each larceny was an independent criminal transaction which can be prosecuted independently. Inasmuch as none of the victims named in the Suffolk County indictment were subjects of the subsequent Nassau County prosecution, there was no bar to the second trial.

Executive Law § 63(3)

October 22, 2014,

Appeals by the defendant, as limited by his motion, (1) from a sentence of the Supreme Court, Queens County, imposed January 27, 1988, the sentence being an indeterminate term of 2 to 4 years imprisonment, upon his conviction of grand larceny in the third degree, after a plea of guilty, and (2) by permission, from an order of the same court dated June 13, 1990, which denied his motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 to vacate his sentence.

A Nassau County Criminal attorney said that on May 14, 1987, at the corner of the Van Wyck Expressway and Atlantic Avenue in Queens, the defendant stole a 1986 Pontiac Firebird. Approximately one hour later, the defendant used the stolen vehicle as a getaway car after an accomplice forcibly stole a woman's purse in Nassau County. After a high speed chase with police, the criminal defendant crashed the car into a telephone pole and was arrested.

In Queens, the defendant was charged, inter alia, with grand larceny in the third degree under Queens County Indictment Number 3518/87. In Nassau County, he was charged, inter alia, with robbery in the second degree.

On August 17, 1987, in the Supreme Court, Queens County, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of grand larceny in the third degree in full satisfaction of the Queens County indictment.

The record indicates that sentencing in Queens County was adjourned numerous times because the defendant was unable to resolve the Nassau County charges. On December 1, 1987, the Supreme Court, Queens County, adjudicated the defendant a second felony offender and specifically informed him that this would be the last adjournment given to enable him to resolve the Nassau County charges.

The Nassau County charges were not resolved by January 27, 1988. The defendant, by counsel, then moved orally in the Supreme Court, Queens County, to vacate his plea. The Supreme Court denied the application, noting that there had been more than five adjournments to allow the defendant to dispose of the Nassau County charges.

On April 21, 1988, the defendant pleaded guilty in the County Court, Nassau County, to one count of robbery in the second degree in satisfaction of Nassau County Indictment Number 66199. The Nassau County Court expressly advised the defendant that the sentence would be for an indeterminate term of four to eight years imprisonment to run consecutively and not concurrently with the two to four years imprisonment he was then serving on the Queens County indictment.

The defendant subsequently moved to vacate the instant [179 A.D.2d 817] sentence imposed on Queens County Indictment Number 3518/87, claiming, inter alia, that the guilty plea had been induced by an unfulfilled promise and that the time limitations imposed by the Supreme Court, Queens County, to resolve the Nassau County charges were not set forth on the record.
On December 1, 1987, the Supreme Court, Queens County, made its intention to go forward with sentencing on January 27, 1988, absolutely clear, and the defendant was aware that he would have to resolve the Nassau County charges before that date in order to take advantage of the promise of concurrent terms of imprisonment. Since the condition for the promise of concurrent terms of imprisonment had not been met, the court was not obligated to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. In addition, the defendant waived any right he may have had to request the fulfillment of the original promise as to sentence, or in the alternative, withdrawal of his guilty plea in Queens County, when he agreed to the imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment upon pleading guilty in Nassau County. Further, no circumstances in this case warrant a modification of the defendant's sentence in the interests of justice.

To Be Cont...

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The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution

October 21, 2014,


The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that Citizens shall be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, of individual liberty and privacy, and the right to be left alone. The landmark Court of Appeals decision in a case, firmly established that “Before the police may stop a person pursuant to the common-law right to inquire there must exist at that moment a founded suspicion that criminal activity is present,” and “the police may not justify a stop by a subsequently acquired suspicion resulting from the stop.” It has been long held that the stop of an automobile constitutes a limited seizure of its occupants for federal and state constitutional purposes. The Court of Appeals has specifically held that in order for a Police Officer to legally stop a vehicle, the Officer needs to have either observed a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, or reasonably suspects that the occupants had been, were then, or were about to be engaged in criminal conduct.

In this case, the Officer testified that she observed defendants entering a bank, in a high crime area, with clothing that was suspicious given the weather conditions. Specifically, the defendants were wearing heavy hooded sweat shirts on a warm day when Officer was wearing a T-shirt. The Officer observed defendants put up their hoods before entering the bank and then she observed them race out of the bank and into a moving Toyota Camry.

The Officer testified that she believed that a bank robbery had occurred. This Court finds that the observations of the Officer correctly supported her belief. It is clear that a Police Officer may not stop a vehicle merely based on a hunch.

The Officer testified that as soon as the defendants were removed from the Toyota Camry, they were handcuffed and placed under arrest. She testified that at the same time, she received a radio call that there had been a bank robbery at the Queens County Savings Bank. The Officer testified that various sums of currency were recovered from each of the defendants. In addition, the Officer stated that she observed the contents of defendant's wallet as it was handed to her because the wallet could not close as it was stuffed with money.

Since this Court finds that there was probable cause to arrest the defendants upon them exiting the car, the search of the defendants was legally permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest.. Defendants' motions to suppress the items recovered pursuant to a search of each of the defendants are hereby denied.

To Be Cont...

The People argue that the Police had a basis to stop the Escalade...cont

October 21, 2014,


The People argue that the Police had a basis to stop the Escalade which fled from the Police. The People also argue that there was probable cause to arrest and search each of the defendants. The People further argue that the statements made by the defendants were voluntarily given.

The Officer testified that he received a radio assignment regarding the robbery at the Jewelers store in Manhasset. The radio assignment indicated that the suspects were male blacks who fled the scene in a black Cadillac Escalade. He then observed a black Cadillac Escalade, traveling westbound on Northern Boulevard, with two (2) male black occupants. Criminal Defense counsel's argument that his observations did not provide him with a reasonable basis to stop the black Cadillac Escalade is simply absurd. It is clear that the Officer observed a vehicle fitting the exact description of the alleged getaway vehicle in the immediate vicinity of the robbery. Whether he observed, at that point, two (2) criminal suspects or multiple suspects is of no moment.

Upon, Officer attempting to pull the black Cadillac Escalade over, the vehicle fled and a high speed chase ensued. Thereafter, he observed the vehicle committing various Vehicle and Traffic Law violations, including traveling at speeds of up to one hundred (100) miles per mile, driving on the wrong side of the street, and crashing into a marked Police car. Further, he witnessed four (4) to five (5) male black individuals leap out of a moving vehicle, run across busy traffic lanes of the Long Island Expressway, jump over a concrete center barrier, and race from the Long Island Expressway.

Since this Court finds that there was probable cause to arrest each of the defendants, the search of each defendant, at the scene of their arrest, was legally permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest.

During a search of defendant, a watch was recovered. Defendant's argument that Officer's removal of his pants amounted to a public strip search is factually inaccurate. Officer testified that defendant was wearing two (2) pairs of pants and it was necessary to remove the first pair to gain access to the hard object which Officer detected in his cuff. Therefore, the removal of the first pair of pants did not render defendant “naked” by any stretch of the imagination.
Regarding the oral statement allegedly made by defendant to Officer, it is clear that the defendant was in Police custody at the time he made the oral statement, since he had been arrested at the golf course. Although he had not been read his “ Miranda Warnings ” prior to making said statement, this Court finds that the defendant was neither being questioned nor interrogated by Officer Alter at the time he made the statement. Therefore, “ Miranda Warnings ” were not required. This Court further finds that said statement was spontaneously and voluntarily made by defendant to Police Officer. Therefore, defendant's motion to suppress the oral statement made to Officer is hereby denied.

Regarding the oral and written statements allegedly made by defendant to Detective, the People elicited testimony from Detective that he introduced himself and asked defendant if he wanted to give a statement. Defendant responded “yes.” Detective testified that he read to defendant his “ Miranda Warnings ” using a Miranda card, which was admitted into evidence as People's Exhibit 1. Detective asked defendant if he understood his rights and was willing to answer questions.

Defendant indicated that he understood his rights, signed and initialed the Miranda card, and agreed to answer questions. Defendant made various oral statements to Detective. The latter reduced defendant's oral statements to written statements. Defendant read the written statements and signed the written statements. Defendant made written changes to his second written statement and read the statement out loud. It is clear that defendant was in custody at the time he made the oral and written statements to Detective.

The Court holds that defendant was properly advised of his “ Miranda Warnings ” by Detective, and that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent, and agreed to answer the questions of Detective. This Court further finds that defendant voluntarily provided the written statements. This Court concludes that the oral and written statements made by defendant to Detective were voluntarily made without any threats, physical force or coercion. Consequently, defendant's motion to suppress the oral and written statements made to Detective is hereby denied.

Nassau County Police Department...cont

October 20, 2014,

It must be emphasized, once again, that a Grand Jury proceeding is not a mini-trial and that the District Attorney is not required to present to the Grand Jury all evidence in its possession. If an evidentiary basis can be established, the trial would be the proper forum for the introduction and exploration of the numerous reports cited by the criminal defense.

The defendant makes the additional argument that the evidence before the Grand Jury was not legally sufficient to establish the offenses charged and therefore the indictment must be dismissed. After a careful inspection of the Grand Jury minutes, the court must disagree with the defendant's argument.

The criminal defendant next argues that the indictment must be dismissed pursuant to CPL §§ 210.20(1)(a) and 210.25(1) because it is defective in that it does not substantially conform to the requirements of CPL § 200.50. CPL § 200.50(7)(a) provides that an indictment must contain a plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of the offense charged and the defendant's or defendants' commission thereof with sufficient precision to clearly apprise the defendant or defendants of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation. It has been held that an indictment must provide the accused with fair notice of the nature of the charges against him, and of the manner, time and place of the conduct underlying the accusations, so as to enable him to answer the charges against him and to prepare an adequate defense. Usually, it is sufficient to charge the language of the statute.

The language of the instant indictment, viewed according to these standards sufficiently conforms to the legal requirements. The defendant's motion based upon this ground, must therefore be denied.

The only point raised by the defendant regarding a dismissal of the indictment on this basis, concerns the chilling effect the prosecution of the defendant would have on others who might apply for benefits in the future. Although the defendant does not engage in an analysis of the factors enumerated in CPL § 210.40, the court after having done so, must deny the motion.

Based upon the foregoing, the defendant's motion to dismiss the instant indictment is denied.

The trial was adjourned until October 24, 2011

October 20, 2014,

In February 7, 2011, a one hundred seven (107) count indictment was filed with the Nassau County Court Clerk charging fourteen (14) defendants, each with a count of Enterprise Corruption, Conspiracy in the Fourth Degree and Scheme to Defraud in the First Degree. Each criminal defendant was charged with additional differing counts, including Money Laundering in various degrees, Falsifying Business Records in various degrees, Identity Theft in the First Degree and Grand Larceny in various degrees.

A Nassau County Criminal Lawyer said that all defendants were arraigned and on April 6, 2011, specific dates were scheduled by the Court regarding time limitations for plea negotiation and discovery. On that date, in light of the large number of defendants, attorneys, witnesses, and the complexity of the case, a firm date of October 17, 2011 was set for the commencement of trial.

The Court inspected the twelve hundred (1,200+) plus pages of grand jury minutes and issued orders on omnibus motions. Various discovery issues were resolved.

Several defendants entered pleas of guilty and were either sentenced or are currently awaiting sentence. On October 17, 2011, four of the defendants had not arrived at a disposition and were about to proceed to trial. Preliminary logistic matters were settled and a jury panel was ordered for October 20, 2011 in anticipation of the commencement of jury selection relative to the trial of the 4 remaining defendants.

Prior to the jury panel entering the courtroom, the People disclosed that they had just discovered that the District Attorney, when filing the indictment, failed to file a special information relative to the enterprise corruption charge and consisting of a statement to the Court attesting that she had reviewed the substance of the evidence presented to the grand jury and concurred in the judgement that the charge is consistent with legislative findings in article four hundred sixty of the Penal Law.

Later that same day, a special information pursuant to CPL § 200.65 was filed with the Clerk of the Nassau County Court. The information was executed by the District Attorney of Nassau County. The District Attorney's attestation, dated October 20, 2011.

To Be Cont...

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he 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution

October 19, 2014,

Defendant is charged with two counts of violating Penal Law § 160.10(1), Robbery in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 160.05, Robbery in the Third Degree as a class D felony; and three counts of violating Penal Law § 155.30(1), Grand larceny in the Fourth Degree as a class E felony. Codefendant Dwight Washington is charged with two counts of violating Penal Law § 160.10(1), Robbery in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 160.05, Robbery in the Third Degree as a class D felony; two counts of violating Penal Law § 155.30(1), Grand larceny in the Fourth Degree as a class E felony; and one count of violating Penal Law § 155.25, Petit Larceny as a class A misdemeanor.

A Nassau County Criminal lawyer said that on January 13, 17, 18, 19, and 23, 2012, upon stipulation by the attorneys, this Court conducted a Huntley, Mapp, and Wade hearing.. The Huntley hearing pertained to various oral and written statements allegedly made by defendants. The Mapp hearing pertained to money allegedly seized from defendants, and various other items allegedly seized from the car owned.

The People called four (4) witnesses at the hearing. The Court finds the testimony of these witnesses to be credible.

Defense counsels argue that there was no reason or basis for the stop of the Toyota Camry in which the defendants were traveling. Defense counsels point out that at the time of the car stop, the Police had no information that a bank robbery had occurred and there was no Vehicle and Traffic Law basis to stop the vehicle. Criminal Defense counsels contend that all the Police had observed prior to the car stop were two individuals in heavy clothes running out of a bank. Further, defense counsels assert that the testimony adduced at the hearing failed to establish a basis for the defendants to be removed from the car and searched. Defense counsels conclude that everything occurring after the defendants were removed from the car should be suppressed.

The People respond that the Officer had a basis to stop the Toyota Camry based on the defendants' suspicious actions; i.e., wearing inappropriate clothing for the season, pulling up hoods over their heads before entering a bank, and running out of the bank a minute later. The People argue that the defendants were properly removed from the Toyota Camry based on the excessive amount of money in the car. The People further argue that the search of the defendants, the duffel bag, and the car, including the trunk, were all proper since they occurred incident to a lawful arrest.

To Be Cont...

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The People argue that the Police had a basis to stop the Escalade

October 19, 2014,

Defendant and co-defendants were charged with three counts of violating Penal Law § 160.15(4), Robbery in the First Degree as a class B felony; three counts of violating Penal Law § 160.15(2), Robbery in the First Degree as a class B felony; three counts of violating Penal Law § 160.10(1), Robbery in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 265.03(1)(b), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 265.03(3), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 155.40(1), Grand larceny in the Second Degree as a class C felony; one count of violating Penal Law § 145.10, Criminal Mischief in the Second Degree as a class D felony and one count of violating Penal Law § 140.35, Possession of Burglar's Tool as a class A misdemeanor.

A Nassau County Criminal lawyer said that on March 1, 5, 6, 8, and 12, 2012, after motion practice by the attorneys, this Court conducted a Huntley, Mapp, and Dunaway hearing. The Huntley hearing pertained to various oral and written statements allegedly made by defendants. The Mapp hearing pertained to items allegedly seized from 2 defendants. The Dunaway hearing pertained to probable cause for the arrest of the 2 defendants.

This Court finds the testimony of 4 Police Officers, and 4 Detectives. An Officer testified that on October 14, 2011, he was working a 7 am to 7 pm tour of duty for the Nassau County Police Department. He was in uniform, working alone, in a marked Nassau County Police vehicle. At approximately 1:52 pm, he was on Northern Boulevard in Manhasset, Nassau County, taking an accident report. While taking the accident report, he received a radio assignment for a robbery at the a jewelry store in Manhasset. The radio assignment indicated that the suspects were male blacks, that they were armed with multiple handguns, and that they fled in a black Cadillac Escalade (hereinafter referred to as the “Escalade”).He pursued the Escalade onto the Long Island Expressway Service Road and then onto the Long Island Expressway. As the traffic on the Long Island Expressway slowed down, he observed four (4) to five (5) male black individuals jump out of the Escalade while it was still moving, run across the traffic lanes of the Long Island Expressway, jump over the center barrier, and exit the Long Island Expressway.

Defense counsels argue that there was no reason or basis for the stop of the Escalade in which the defendants were traveling. Defense counsel for defendant points out that the description of the alleged fleeing suspects was “multiple male blacks in an Escalade.” He argues that since Officer testified that he only observed two male blacks in an Escalade, the description did not match. Defense counsels also argue that there was no reason or basis to arrest each defendant since, at the time of their arrests, they were not doing anything wrong. Defense counsels argue that none of the statements allegedly given by their clients were voluntary since their clients were either injured, wet, tired or hungry.

In addition, defense counsel for defendant argues that the People elicited testimony regarding two statements allegedly made by Reggie Fowler for which the People failed to give any prior notice. Defense counsel moves to suppress those statements.

To Be Cont....

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